Related papers: Distributionally Robust Contract Design with Defer…
This article aims to introduce the paradigm of distributional robustness from the field of convex optimization to tackle optimal design problems under uncertainty. We consider realistic situations where the physical model, and thereby the…
We study the optimal contract problem in the \emph{combinatorial actions} framework of D\"utting et al.~[FOCS'21], where a principal delegates a project to an agent who chooses a subset of hidden, costly actions, and the resulting reward is…
In this article, we employ a principal-agent model to analyze optimal contract design in a monopolistic reinsurance market under adverse selection with a continuum of insurer types. Instead of using the classical expected utility framework,…
When machine learning is outsourced to a rational agent, conflicts of interest might arise and severely impact predictive performance. In this work, we propose a theoretical framework for incentive-aware delegation of machine learning…
The problem of computing near-optimal contracts in combinatorial settings has recently attracted significant interest in the computer science community. Previous work has provided a rich body of structural and algorithmic insights into this…
This paper considers the distributed robust suboptimal consensus control problem of linear multi-agent systems, with both H2 and H_infty performance requirements. A novel two-step complementary design approach is proposed. In the first…
We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity-averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minimum utility, the principal can strictly gain from using an…
In the current work we introduce a novel estimation of distribution algorithm to tackle a hard combinatorial optimization problem, namely the single-machine scheduling problem, with uncertain delivery times. The majority of the existing…
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…
We consider a combined problem of teaming and scheduling of multi-skilled employees that have to perform jobs with uncertain qualification requirements. We propose two modeling approaches that generate solutions that are robust to possible…
In this paper, we consider a network capacity expansion problem in the context of telecommunication networks, where there is uncertainty associated with the expected traffic demand. We employ a distributionally robust stochastic…
We present a novel framework for distributionally robust optimization (DRO), called cost-aware DRO (CADRO). The key idea of CADRO is to exploit the cost structure in the design of the ambiguity set to reduce conservatism. Particularly, the…
This paper considers the distributed robust control problems of uncertain linear multi-agent systems with undirected communication topologies. It is assumed that the agents have identical nominal dynamics while subject to different…
Stochastic multi-agent systems are a central modeling framework for autonomous controllers, communication protocols, and cyber-physical infrastructures. In many such systems, however, transition probabilities are only estimated from data…
In the classical principal-agent problem, a principal must design a contract to incentivize an agent to perform an action on behalf of the principal. We study the classical principal-agent problem in a setting where the agent can be of one…
In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions…
We study a dynamic contracting problem with multiple agents and limited commitment. A principal seeks to screen efficient agents using one-period contracts, but is tempted to revise contract terms upon knowing an agent's type. Alterations…
A principal contracts with an agent through an informed delegate. Although the principal cannot directly mediate the interaction, she can restrict the menus of contracts the delegate may offer. We characterize the outcomes implementable…
In the combinatorial-action contract model (D\"utting et al., FOCS'21) a principal delegates the execution of a complex project to an agent, who can choose any subset from a given set of actions. Each set of actions incurs a cost to the…
We consider a model of bilateral trade with private values. The value of the buyer and the cost of the seller are jointly distributed. The true joint distribution is unknown to the designer, however, the marginal distributions of the value…