Related papers: Non-exchangeable evolutionary and mean field games…
An alternate Lagrangian scheme at discrete times is proposed for the approximation of a nonlinear continuity equation arising as a mean-field limit of spatially inhomogeneous evolutionary games, describing the evolution of a system of…
Evolutionary game theory is an abstract and simple, but very powerful way to model evolutionary dynamics. Even complex biological phenomena can sometimes be abstracted to simple two-player games. But often, the interaction between several…
We investigate large-scale effects induced by external fields, phenomenologically interpreted as mass media, in multiagent models evolving with the microscopic dynamics of the binary naming game. In particular, we show that a single…
Coevolving and competing species or game-theoretic strategies exhibit rich and complex dynamics for which a general theoretical framework based on finite populations is still lacking. Recently, an explicit mean-field description in the form…
This paper investigates the long-term behavior of an interacting particle system of interest in the hot topic of evolutionary game theory. Each site of the $d$-dimensional integer lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
We consider a novel model of stochastic replicator dynamics for potential games that converts to a Langevin equation on a sphere after a change of variables. This is distinct from the models studied earlier. In particular, it is ill-posed…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
Mean-field game theory relies on approximating games that are intractable to model due to a very large to infinite population of players. While these kinds of games can be solved analytically via the associated system of partial…
Despite increasing attention paid to the need for fast, scalable methods to analyze next-generation neuroscience data, comparatively little attention has been paid to the development of similar methods for behavioral analysis. Just as the…
The emergence and promotion of cooperation are two of the main issues in evolutionary game theory, as cooperation is amenable to exploitation by defectors, which take advantage of cooperative individuals at no cost, dooming them to…
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator…
Environmental changes play a critical role in determining the evolution of social dilemmas in many natural or social systems. Generally, the environmental changes include two prominent aspects: the global time-dependent fluctuations and the…
Trust is a fundamental concept that underpins the coherence and resilience of social systems and shapes human behavior. Despite the importance of trust as a social and psychological concept, the concept has not gained much attention from…
We study the dynamics of the out-of-equilibrium nonlinear q-voter model with two types of susceptible voters and zealots, introduced in [EPL 113, 48001 (2016)]. In this model, each individual supports one of two parties and is either a…
Mating preferences of many biological species are not constant but season-dependent. Within the framework of evolutionary game theory this can be modeled with two finite opposite-sex populations playing against each other following the…
We study first order evolutive Mean Field Games whose operators are non-coercive. This situation occurs, for instance, when some directions are `forbidden' to the generic player at some points. Under some regularity assumptions, we…
Understanding the dynamic processes of a real game system requires an appropriate dynamics model, and rigorously testing a dynamics model is non-trivial. In our methodological research, we develop an approach to testing the validity of game…
This paper presents a model of network formation in repeated games where the players adapt their strategies and network ties simultaneously using a simple reinforcement-learning scheme. It is demonstrated that the coevolutionary dynamics of…
Populations of replicating entities frequently experience sudden or cyclical changes in environment. We explore the implications of this phenomenon via a environmental switching parameter in several common evolutionary dynamics models…