Related papers: Cognitive Biases at Play? Insights from a Bayesian…
Deception plays a key role in adversarial or strategic interactions for the purpose of self-defence and survival. This paper introduces a general framework and solution to address deception. Most existing approaches for deception consider…
Understanding how biological organisms make decisions is of fundamental importance in understanding behavior. Such an understanding within evolutionary game theory so far has been sought by appealing to bounded rationality. Here, we present…
This work contains the mathematical exploration of a few prototypical games in which central concepts from statistics and probability theory naturally emerge. The first two kinds of games are termed Fisher and Bayesian games, which are…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Classical results of Decision Theory, and its extension to a multi-agent setting: Game Theory, operate only at the associative level of information; this is, classical decision makers only take into account probabilities of events; we go…
In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. In such a game each player has two types. Either the player is a rational player seeking to…
Research on cognitive biases and heuristics has become increasingly popular in the visualization literature in recent years. Researchers have studied the effects of biases on visualization interpretation and subsequent decision-making.…
We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian…
We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…
Econometric models of strategic interactions among people or firms have received a great deal of attention in the literature. Less attention has been paid to the role of the underlying assumptions about the way agents form beliefs about…
We present a subjective equilibrium notion (called "subjective equilibrium under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty (SEBEU)" for stochastic dynamic games in which each player chooses her decisions under the (incorrect) belief that a…
Every interaction of a living organism with its environment involves the placement of a bet. Armed with partial knowledge about a stochastic world, the organism must decide its next step or near-term strategy, an act that implicitly or…
Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the real-world follows, optimize their trading…
We consider a system consisting of multiple interdependent assets, and a set of defenders, each responsible for securing a subset of the assets against an attacker. The interdependencies between the assets are captured by an attack graph,…
Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly mediate economic and organisational processes, from automated customer support and recruitment to investment advice and policy analysis. These systems are often assumed to embody rational decision…
A quantum financial approach to finite games of strategy is addressed, with an extension of Nash's theorem to the quantum financial setting, allowing for an entanglement of games of strategy with two-period financial allocation problems…
At first glance, quantum mechanics and behavioural science seem worlds apart -- one rooted in equations and particles, the other in thoughts and choices. Yet, emerging research reveals a profound and unexpected bridge between them. This…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…