Related papers: Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Bl…
Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include "on-chain" from the pool of all pending transactions. This paper investigates the…
In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both non-zero miner…
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model…
Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the transaction fee mechanism design fundamentally departs from classical…
Blockchain systems come with the promise of being inclusive for a variety of decentralized applications (DApps) that can serve different purposes and have different urgency requirements. Despite this, the transaction fee mechanisms…
Transaction fees represent a major incentive in many blockchain systems as a way to incentivize processing transactions. Unfortunately, they also introduce an enormous amount of incentive asymmetry compared to alternatives like fixed block…
This paper studies the optimal transaction fee mechanisms for blockchains, focusing on the distinction between price-based ($\mathcal{P}$) and quantity-based ($\mathcal{Q}$) controls. By analyzing factors such as demand uncertainty,…
In blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, users compete in a transaction fee auction to get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the desiderata for a "dream" transaction fee mechanism (TFM),…
With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology, the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) in blockchain systems has become a prominent research topic. An ideal TFM should satisfy user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive…
In recent years, prominent blockchain systems such as Bitcoin and Ethereum have experienced explosive growth in transaction volume, leading to frequent surges in demand for limited block space and causing transaction fees to fluctuate by…
We develop a model of coordination and allocation of decentralized multi-sided markets, in which our theoretical analysis is promisingly optimizing the decentralized transaction packaging process at high-throughput blockchains or Web 3.0…
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considered `good' if, informally-speaking, each party (i.e., the…
The recently proposed Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) literature studies the strategic interaction between the miner of a block and the transaction creators (or users) in a blockchain. In a TFM, the miner includes transactions that maximize…
Low transaction throughput and poor scalability are significant issues in public blockchain consensus protocols such as Bitcoins. Recent research efforts in this direction have proposed shard-based consensus protocols where the key idea is…
Existing fair exchange protocols usually neglect consideration of cost when assessing their fairness. However, in an environment with non-negligible transaction cost, e.g., public blockchains, high or unexpected transaction cost might be an…
Censorship resistance is one of the core value proposition of blockchains. A recurring design pattern aimed at providing censorship resistance is enabling multiple proposers to contribute inputs into block construction. Notably, Fork-Choice…
In blockchain-based order book systems, buyers and sellers trade assets, while it is miners to match them and include their transactions in the blockchain. It is found that many miners behave selfishly and myopically, prioritizing…
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies prioritize transactions based on their fees, creating a unique kind of fee market. Empirically, this market has failed to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices for desired levels of service. We…
Blockchain protocols often seek to procure computationally challenging work from a decentralized set of participants. While there are simple procurement auctions that result in the minimal cost of acquisition and maximal efficiency, they…
Blockchains rely on economic incentives to ensure secure and decentralised operation, making incentive compatibility a core design concern. However, protocols are rarely deployed in isolation. Applications interact with the underlying…