Related papers: Reputational cheap talk: influentialness and welfa…
This work investigates a dynamic variant of Bayesian persuasion, in which a strategic sender seeks to influence a receiver's belief over time through controlling the timing of the information disclosure, under resource constraints. We…
An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number of mediators, the sender's optimal value is characterized.…
A network of agents attempt to learn some unknown state of the world drawn by nature from a finite set. Agents observe private signals conditioned on the true state, and form beliefs about the unknown state accordingly. Each agent may face…
In this paper, we study the information propagation in an empirical blogging network by game-theoretical approach. The blogging network has small-world property and is scale-free. Individuals in the blogosphere coordinate their decisions…
In this article, a survey of several important equilibrium concepts for decentralized networks is presented. The term decentralized is used here to refer to scenarios where decisions (e.g., choosing a power allocation policy) are taken…
Mutual information among three or more dimensions (mu-star = - Q) has been considered as interaction information. However, Krippendorff (2009a, 2009b) has shown that this measure cannot be interpreted as a unique property of the…
This paper studies the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender's disclosure. These settings include monopoly pricing,…
We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the…
Bayesian persuasion, an extension of cheap-talk communication, involves an informed sender committing to a signaling scheme to influence a receiver's actions. Compared to cheap talk, this sender's commitment enables the receiver to verify…
When different information sources on a given topic are combined, they interact in a nontrivial manner for a rational receiver of these information sources. Suppose that there are two information sources, one is genuine and the other…
We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores…
Recently, information transmission models motivated by the classical epidemic propagation, have been applied to a wide-range of social systems, generally assume that information mainly transmits among individuals via peer-to-peer…
In this paper, we study an extension of the classic long cheap talk equilibrium introduced by Aumann and Hart~\citeN{aumann-hart-03}, and ask how much can the players benefit from having a trusted mediator compared with the standard…
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…
With the explosive growth of accessible information, expecially on the Internet, evaluation-based filtering has become a crucial task. Various systems have been devised aiming to sort through large volumes of information and select what is…
The information system (T.V., newspapers, blogs, social network platforms) and its inner dynamics play a fundamental role on the evolution of collective debates and thus on the public opinion. In this work we address such a process focusing…
A persuasion policy successfully persuades an agent to pick a particular action only if the information is designed in a manner that convinces the agent that it is in their best interest to pick that action. Thus, it is natural to ask, what…
How does the politician's reputation concern affect information provision when the information is endogenously provided by a biased lobbyist? I develop a model to study this problem and show that the answer depends on the transparency…
Recently, it was discovered that the `quantum partial information' needed to merge one party's state with another party's state is given by the conditional entropy, which can be negative [Horodecki, Oppenheim, and Winter, Nature 436, 673…
A buyer and a seller bargain over the price of an object. Both players can build reputations for being obstinate by offering the same price over time. Before players bargain, the seller decides whether to adopt a new technology that can…