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Today we rely on networks that are created and maintained by smart devices. For such networks, there is no governing central authority but instead the network structure is shaped by the decisions of selfish intelligent agents. A key…
Graph games are fundamental in strategic reasoning of multi-agent systems and their environments. We study a new family of graph games which combine stochastic environmental uncertainties and auction-based interactions among the agents,…
Fairness is desirable yet challenging to achieve within multi-agent systems, especially when agents differ in latent traits that affect their abilities. This hidden heterogeneity often leads to unequal distributions of wealth, even when…
In this paper, we examine the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning under uncertainty. Specifically, we analyze two stochastic models of regularized learning in continuous games -- one in continuous and one in discrete time with the…
Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…
Game theory relies heavily on the availability of cardinal utility functions, but in fields such as matching markets, only ordinal preferences are typically elicited. The literature focuses on mechanisms with simple dominant strategies, but…
We introduce Game networks (G nets), a novel representation for multi-agent decision problems. Compared to other game-theoretic representations, such as strategic or extensive forms, G nets are more structured and more compact; more…
We study a non-cooperative two-sided facility location game in which facilities and clients behave strategically. This is in contrast to many other facility location games in which clients simply visit their closest facility. Facility…
Many interactions result in a socially suboptimal equilibrium, or in a non-equilibrium state, from which arriving at an equilibrium through simple dynamics can be impossible of too long. Aiming to achieve a certain equilibrium, we persuade,…
We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…
In this paper, we study a variant of hedonic games, called \textsc{Seat Arrangement}. The model is defined by a bijection from agents with preferences for each other to vertices in a graph $G$. The utility of an agent depends on the…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
A central question in routing games has been to establish conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, either in terms of network topology or in terms of costs. This question is well understood in two classes of routing games. The…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
Thermodynamic selection is an indirect competition between agents feeding on the same energy resource and obeying the laws of thermodynamics. We examine scenarios of this selection, where the agent is modeled as a heat-engine coupled to two…
We study the distribution of strategies in a large game that models how agents choose among different double auction markets. We classify the possible mean field Nash equilibria, which include potentially segregated states where an agent…
In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a…
We address the challenge of reliable and efficient interaction in autonomous multi-agent systems, where agents must balance long-term strategic objectives with short-term dynamic adaptation. We propose context-triggered contingency games, a…
We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given…