Related papers: Stability in Single-Peaked Strategic Resource Sele…
Schelling's segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant.…
In this paper we study mean field games with possibly multiple mean field equilibria. Instead of focusing on the individual equilibria, we propose to study the set of values over all possible equilibria, which we call the set value of the…
When group members claim a portion of limited resources, it is tempting to invest more effort to get a larger share. However, if everyone acts similarly, they all get the same piece they would obtain without extra effort. This is the…
We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate dependencies among resources as they exist in modern networked environments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES)…
Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…
Current research applying N-level Stackelberg Game to multi-agent systems often uses the default decision order of agents provided by the environment. However, this raises the question: does the order of agents necessarily affect the final…
We study a multi-objective model on the allocation of reusable resources under model uncertainty. Heterogeneous customers arrive sequentially according to a latent stochastic process, request for certain amounts of resources, and occupy…
A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…
Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium, have been key to finding stable joint actions in multi-player games. However, it has been shown that the dynamics of agents' interactions, even in simple two-player games with…
We define and analyze a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in which decision-making agents can observe the choices and rewards of their neighbors. Neighbors are defined by a network graph with heterogeneous and stochastic…
The phenomenon of group cooperation constitutes a fundamental mechanism underlying various social and biological systems. Complex networks provide a structural framework for group interactions, where individuals can not only obtain…
We introduce a framework for stochastic games on large sparse graphs, covering continuous-time and discrete-time dynamic games as well as static games. Players are indexed by the vertices of simple, locally finite graphs, allowing both…
We develop an empirical framework to identify and estimate the effects of treatments on outcomes of interest when the treatments are the result of strategic interaction (e.g., bargaining, oligopolistic entry, peer effects). We consider a…
In repeated games, such as auctions, players rely on autonomous learning agents to choose their actions. We study settings in which players have their agents make monetary transfers to other agents during play at their own expense, in order…
Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…
In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general class of resource allocation problems in which a set of…
We study the problem of a planner who resolves risk-return trade-offs - like financial investment decisions - on behalf of a collective of agents with heterogeneous risk preferences. The planner's objective is a two-stage utility functional…
We consider agents in a social network competing to be selected as partners in collaborative, mutually beneficial activities. We study this through a model in which an agent i can initiate a limited number k_i>0 of games and selects the…
Network games provide a framework to study strategic decision making processes that are governed by structured interdependencies among agents. However, existing models do not account for environments in which agents simultaneously interact…
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…