Related papers: Minimizing Envy and Maximizing Happiness in Graphi…
How can one assign roommates and rooms when tenants have preferences for both where and with whom they live? In this setting, the usual notions of envy-freeness and maximizing social welfare may not hold; the roommate rent-division problem…
We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy,…
We consider the problem of reforming an envy-free matching when each agent is assigned a single item. Given an envy-free matching, we consider an operation to exchange the item of an agent with an unassigned item preferred by the agent that…
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents with additional conflict constraints. These are represented by a conflict graph where each item corresponds to a vertex of the graph and edges in the graph represent…
We study the problem of partitioning a set of agents into coalitions based on the agents' additively separable preferences, which can also be viewed as a hedonic game. We apply three successively weaker solution concepts, namely…
We study the allocation of indivisible goods under conflicting constraints, represented by a graph. In this framework, vertices correspond to goods and edges correspond to conflicts between a pair of goods. Each agent is allocated an…
In the envy-free cake-cutting problem we are given a resource, usually called a cake and represented as the $[0,1]$ interval, and a set of $n$ agents with heterogeneous preferences over pieces of the cake. The goal is to divide the cake…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
This paper proposes a novel graph-constrained generative adversarial network, whose generator and discriminator are built upon relational architecture. The main idea is to encode the constraint into the graph structure of its relational…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items subject to conflict constraints. In this framework, the items are represented as the vertices of a graph, with edges corresponding to conflicts between pairs of items. Each agent is assigned…
When an old apartment building is demolished and rebuilt, how can we fairly redistribute the new apartments to minimize envy among residents? We reduce this question to a combinatorial optimization problem called the *Min Max Average Cycle…
We study the computational complexity of fair division of indivisible items in an enriched model: there is an underlying graph on the set of items. And we have to allocate the items (i.e., the vertices of the graph) to a set of agents in…
Given a connected graph on whose edges we can build roads to connect the nodes, a number of agents hold possibly different perspectives on which edges should be selected by assigning different edge weights. Our task is to build a minimum…
Fair division is the problem of allocating a set of items among agents in a fair manner. One of the most sought-after fairness notions is envy-freeness (EF), requiring that no agent envies another's allocation. When items are indivisible,…
We study the classic problem of dividing a collection of indivisible resources in a fair and efficient manner among a set of agents having varied preferences. Pareto optimality is a standard notion of economic efficiency, which states that…
We consider the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible items (goods or bads) under capacity constraints. In this setting, we are given a set of categorized items. Each category has a capacity constraint (the same for all…
We study the problem of assigning agents to the vertices of a graph such that no pair of neighbors can benefit from swapping assignments -- a property we term neighborhood stability. We further assume that agents' utilities are based solely…
We introduce a problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (items) in which the agents' valuations cannot be observed directly, but instead can only be accessed via noisy queries. In the two-agent setting with Gaussian noise and bounded…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents whose preferences include externalities. Unlike the standard fair division model, agents may derive positive or negative utility not only from items allocated…
We give parallel and distributed algorithms for the housing allocation problem. In this problem, there is a set of agents and a set of houses. Each agent has a strict preference list for a subset of houses. We need to find a matching such…