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Envy-Free Allocation of Indivisible Goods via Noisy Queries

Computer Science and Game Theory 2026-05-29 v2 Information Theory Machine Learning math.IT Machine Learning

Abstract

We introduce a problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods (items) in which the agents' valuations cannot be observed directly, but instead can only be accessed via noisy queries. In the two-agent setting with Gaussian noise and bounded valuations, we derive upper and lower bounds on the required number of queries for finding an envy-free allocation in terms of the number of items, mm, and the negative-envy of the optimal allocation, Δ\Delta. In particular, when Δ\Delta is not too small (namely, Δm1/4\Delta \gg m^{1/4}), we establish that the optimal number of queries scales as m(Δ/m)2=m2.5Δ2\frac{\sqrt m }{(\Delta / m)^2} = \frac{m^{2.5}}{\Delta^2} up to logarithmic factors. Our upper bound is based on non-adaptive queries and a simple thresholding-based allocation algorithm that runs in polynomial time, while our lower bound holds even under adaptive queries and arbitrary computation time.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2602.06361,
  title  = {Envy-Free Allocation of Indivisible Goods via Noisy Queries},
  author = {Zihan Li and Yan Hao Ling and Jonathan Scarlett and Warut Suksompong},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.06361},
  year   = {2026}
}

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