Related papers: Approximately Dominating Sets in Elections
In an epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon in expectation by unilateral deviation. An epsilon well-supported approximate Nash equilibrium has the stronger requirement that every pure strategy used with…
We study the following metric distortion problem: there are two finite sets of points, $V$ and $C$, that lie in the same metric space, and our goal is to choose a point in $C$ whose total distance from the points in $V$ is as small as…
This work analyses surprising elections, and attempts to quantify the notion of surprise in elections. A voter is surprised if their estimate of the winner (assumed to be based on a combination of the preferences of their social connections…
We consider an odd-sized "jury", which votes sequentially between two states of Nature (say A and B, or Innocent and Guilty) with the majority opinion determining the verdict. Jurors have private information in the form of a signal in…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
There is a growing need for discrete choice models that account for the complex nature of human choices, escaping traditional behavioral assumptions such as the transitivity of pairwise preferences. Recently, several parametric models of…
Voting can abstractly model any decision-making scenario and as such it has been extensively studied over the decades. Recently, the related literature has focused on quantifying the impact of utilizing only limited information in the…
Conflict of interest is the permanent companion of any population of agents (computational or biological). For that reason, the ability to compromise is of paramount importance, making voting a key element of societal mechanisms. One of the…
Most social choice rules assume access to full rankings, while current alignment practice -- despite aiming for diversity -- typically treats voters as anonymous and comparisons as independent, effectively extracting only about one bit per…
Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked on a…
We consider the classic Multi-Armed Bandit setting to understand the exploration/exploitation tradeoffs made by different search heuristics. Since many search heuristics work by comparing different options (in evolutionary algorithms called…
Election systems based on scores generally determine the winner by computing the score of each candidate and the winner is the candidate with the best score. It would be natural to expect that computing the winner of an election is at least…
We introduce BallotRank, a ranked preference aggregation method derived from a modified PageRank algorithm. It is a Condorcet-consistent method without damping, and empirical examination of nearly 2,000 ranked choice elections and over…
Epistemic social choice aims at unveiling a hidden ground truth given votes, which are interpreted as noisy signals about it. We consider here a simple setting where votes consist of approval ballots: each voter approves a set of…
We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination under the Monroe and Chamberlin--Courant multiwinner voting rules, which determine the set of representatives by optimizing the total (dis)satisfaction of the voters with their…
We present a relation-algebraic model of Condorcet voting and, based on it, relation-algebraic solutions of the constructive control problem via the removal of voters. We consider two winning conditions, viz. to be a Condorcet winner and to…
We present a collection of $7582$ real-world elections divided into $25$ datasets from various sources ranging from sports competitions over music charts to survey- and indicator-based rankings. We provide evidence that the collected…
Classical voting rules assume that ballots are complete preference orders over candidates. However, when the number of candidates is large enough, it is too costly to ask the voters to rank all candidates. We suggest to fix a rank k, to ask…
Most democratic countries use election methods to transform election results into whole numbers which usually give the number of seats in a legislative body the parties obtained. Which election method does this best can be specified by…
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever voters' preferences are restricted to the domain, the pairwise majority relation (for an odd number of voters) is transitive and hence a linear order. Determining…