Related papers: Matching with regional constraints: An equivalence
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
A run of the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm may contain proposals that are sure to be rejected. We introduce the accelerated deferred acceptance algorithm that proceeds in a similar manner to DA but with sure-to-be rejected proposals…
The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) is the most widely accepted and used algorithm to match students, workers, or residents to colleges, firms or hospitals respectively. In this paper, we consider for the first time, the complexity of…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have been proposed to correct this inefficiency. However, we…
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects…
Centralized assignment markets have historically relied on Deferred-Acceptance (DA) algorithms, which do not incorporate multiple objectives into the assignment. In this work, we propose an optimization-based many-to-one assignment…
We present distributed algorithms that can be used by multiple agents to align their estimates with a particular value over a network with time-varying connectivity. Our framework is general in that this value can represent a consensus…
The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied to many real-life application domains. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of environments, researchers and practitioners have encountered…
Distributed allocation finds applications in many scenarios including CPU scheduling, distributed energy resource management, and networked coverage control. In this paper, we propose a fast convergent optimization algorithm with a tunable…
MapReduce framework is the de facto standard in Hadoop. Considering the data locality in data centers, the load balancing problem of map tasks is a special case of affinity scheduling problem. There is a huge body of work on affinity…
Dual decomposition is widely utilized in distributed optimization of multi-agent systems. In practice, the dual decomposition algorithm is desired to admit an asynchronous implementation due to imperfect communication, such as time delay…
This paper considers distributed resource allocation problems (DRAPs) with a coupled constraint for real-time systems. Based on primal-dual methods, we adopt a control perspective for optimization algorithm design by synthesizing a safe…
Existing asynchronous distributed optimization algorithms often use diminishing step-sizes that cause slow practical convergence, or fixed step-sizes that depend on an assumed upper bound of delays. Not only is such a delay bound hard to…
The paper studies a distributed constrained optimization problem, where multiple agents connected in a network collectively minimize the sum of individual objective functions subject to a global constraint being an intersection of the local…
We initiate the study of distortion in stable matching. Concretely, we aim to design algorithms that have limited access to the agents' cardinal preferences and compute stable matchings of high quality with respect to some aggregate…
This article explores distributed convex optimization with globally-coupled constraints, where the objective function is a general nonsmooth convex function, the constraints include nonlinear inequalities and affine equalities, and the…
We study the strategic simplicity of stable matching mechanisms where one side has fixed preferences, termed priorities. Specifically, we ask which priorities are such that the strategyproofness of deferred acceptance (DA) can be recognized…
Sponsored search auctions are commonly modeled as an assignment of a fixed set of slots (positions) to a set of advertisers, with welfare maximization being reducible to a standard matching problem. Motivated by modern ad formats, we study…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…