Related papers: Stealthy Sensor Attacks Against Direct Data-Driven…
Machine learning is vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks. It is now well understood that by changing the underlying data distribution, an adversary can poison the model trained with it or introduce backdoors. In this paper we present a…
Malicious adversaries can attack machine learning models to infer sensitive information or damage the system by launching a series of evasion attacks. Although various work addresses privacy and security concerns, they focus on individual…
This paper proposes a new framework and several results to quantify the performance of data-driven state-feedback controllers for linear systems against targeted perturbations of the training data. We focus on the case where subsets of the…
This paper studies the attack detection problem in a data-driven and model-free setting, for deterministic systems with linear and time-invariant dynamics. Differently from existing studies that leverage knowledge of the system dynamics to…
The rise of cyber-security concerns has brought significant attention to the analysis and design of cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Among the various types of cyberattacks, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and false data injection (FDI)…
Data poisoning attacks aim to manipulate the model produced by a learning algorithm by adversarially modifying the training set. We consider differential privacy as a defensive measure against this type of attack. We show that such learners…
In this paper, we have proposed a resilient reinforcement learning method for discrete-time linear systems with unknown parameters, under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. The proposed method is based on policy iteration that learns the…
The increasing ease of obtaining and processing data together with the growth in system complexity has sparked the interest in moving from conventional model-based control design towards data-driven concepts. Since in many engineering…
In recent years, many efforts have demonstrated that modern machine learning algorithms are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, where small, but carefully crafted, perturbations on the input can make them fail. While these attack methods are…
Given the recent surge of interest in data-driven control, this paper proposes a two-step method to study robust data-driven control for a parameter-unknown linear time-invariant (LTI) system that is affected by energy-bounded noises.…
The `security index' of a discrete-time LTI system under sensor attacks is introduced as a quantitative measure on the security of an observable system. We derive ideas from error control coding theory to provide sufficient conditions for…
This paper considers the problem of detector tuning against false data injection attacks. In particular, we consider an adversary injecting false sensor data to maximize the state deviation of the plant, referred to as impact, whilst being…
With the ever-increasing reliance on data for data-driven applications in power grids, such as event cause analysis, the authenticity of data streams has become crucially important. The data can be prone to adversarial stealthy attacks…
In this work we present a formal theoretical framework for assessing and analyzing two classes of malevolent action towards generic Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. Our results apply to general multi-class classifiers that map from an…
Data injection attacks (DIAs) pose a significant cybersecurity threat to the Smart Grid by enabling an attacker to compromise the integrity of data acquisition and manipulate estimated states without triggering bad data detection…
Recent works investigated attacks on sensors by influencing analog sensor components with acoustic, light, and electromagnetic signals. Such attacks can have extensive security, reliability, and safety implications since many types of the…
Intelligent attackers can suitably tamper sensor/actuator data at various Smart grid surfaces causing intentional power oscillations, which if left undetected, can lead to voltage disruptions. We develop a novel combination of formal…
The problem of mitigating maliciously injected signals in interconnected systems is dealt with in this paper. We consider the class of covert attacks, as they are stealthy and cannot be detected by conventional means in centralized…
Autonomous agents deployed in the real world need to be robust against adversarial attacks on sensory inputs. Robustifying agent policies requires anticipating the strongest attacks possible. We demonstrate that existing observation-space…
Safety filters ensure that only safe control actions are executed. We propose a simple and stealthy false-data injection attack for deactivating such safety filters; in particular, we focus on deactivating safety filters that are based on…