Related papers: Existence of Bayesian Equilibria in Incomplete Inf…

We introduce a solution concept for extensive-form games of incomplete information in which players need not assign likelihoods to what they do not know about the game. This is embedded in a model in which players can hold multiple priors.…

In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…

A new concept of an equilibrium in games is introduced that solves an open question posed by A. Neyman.

In dynamic games with asymmetric information structure, the widely used concept of equilibrium is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). This is expressed as a strategy and belief pair that simultaneously satisfy sequential rationality and…

A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered, and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite actions spaces, bounded…

Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…

Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…

This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…

Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…

This paper introduces risk-revising players to a class of games with incomplete information. These players enter the game with ex ante risk preferences represented by coherent risk measures and develop time-consistent interim revisions of…

Bayesian games model interactive decision-making where players have incomplete information -- e.g., regarding payoffs and private data on players' strategies and preferences -- and must actively reason and update their belief models (with…

Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation using an incomplete information game. The true game may involve correlated, duplicated belief hierarchies, but the analyst lacks knowledge of the correlation structure and can only…

We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations…

This study investigates differential games with motion-payoff uncertainty in continuous-time settings. We propose a framework where players update their beliefs about uncertain parameters using continuous Bayesian updating. Theoretical…

The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them. Solutions concepts implementing…

This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…

We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the…

Bayesian regression games are a special class of two-player general-sum Bayesian games in which the learner is partially informed about the adversary's objective through a Bayesian prior. This formulation captures the uncertainty in regard…

This paper examines strategic trading under incomplete information, where firms lack full knowledge of key aspects of their competitors' trading strategies such as target sizes and market impact models. We extend previous work on…

Drawing on ideas from game theory and quantum physics, we investigate nonlocal correlations from the point of view of equilibria in games of incomplete information. These equilibria can be classified in decreasing power as communication…