Related papers: Replicator-mutator dynamics for public goods games…
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation has attracted intensive scholarly interest and has been analysed within the framework of evolutionary game theory. The role of innovation, which introduces novel strategies into the population,…
Destructive agents, who opt out of the game and indiscriminately harm others, paradoxically foster cooperation, representing an intriguing variant of the voluntary participation strategy. Yet, their impact on cooperation remains…
Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator…
Studying social dilemmas prompts the question of how cooperation can emerge in situations where individuals are expected to act selfishly. Here, in the framework of the one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG), we introduce the concept that…
Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation.…
In this Brief Report we study the evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods Game in a population of mobile agents embedded in a 2-dimensional space. In this framework, the backbone of interactions between agents changes in time, allowing us…
Finding ways to overcome the temptation to exploit one another is still a challenge in behavioural sciences. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, punishing strategies are frequently used to promote cooperation in competitive…
We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy ("cooperation" and "defection") games in populations comprising cooperation facilitators. The latter are individuals that…
Societies consisting of cooperative individuals seem to require for their continuing success that defectors be policed. The precise connection between punishers and benefits, population structure, and division of labour, however, remains…
Previous research has highlighted the importance of strong heterogeneity for the successful evolution of cooperation in games governed by pairwise interactions. Here we determine to what extent this is true for games governed by group…
Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…
We propose a simple model of network co-evolution in a game-dynamical system of interacting agents that play repeated games with their neighbors, and adapt their behaviors and network links based on the outcome of those games. The…
A replicator dynamic for non-exchangeable agents in a continuous action space is formulated and its well-posedness is proven in a space of probability measures. The non-exchangeability allows for the analysis of evolutionary games involving…
We study the evolution of two mutually interacting games with both pairwise games as well as the public goods game on different topologies. On 2d square lattices, we reveal that the game-game interaction can promote the cooperation…
Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying…
Punishment as a mechanism for promoting cooperation has been studied extensively for more than two decades, but its effectiveness remains a matter of dispute. Here, we examine how punishment's impact varies across cooperative settings…
Understanding the evolution of cooperation in multiplayer games is of vital significance for natural and social systems. An important challenge is that group interactions often leads to nonlinear synergistic effects. However, previous…
Recently, the eco-evolutionary game theory which describes the coupled dynamics of strategies and environment have attracted great attention. At the same time, most of the current work is focused on the classic two-player two-strategy game.…
The replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes the change in a population's behaviors over time given suitable incentives. It arises when individuals make decisions using a simple learning process - imitation. A recent…
We generalize the Bush--Mosteller learning, the Roth--Erev learning, and the social learning to include mistakes such that the nonlinear replicator-mutator equation with either additive or multiplicative mutation is generated in an…