Related papers: Equity in strategic exchange
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…
We consider a novel setting where a set of items are matched to the same set of agents repeatedly over multiple rounds. Each agent gets exactly one item per round, which brings interesting challenges to finding efficient and/or fair {\em…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how some fixed value should be shared among them. We are interested in settings where the share that each agent receives is based on how that agent is evaluated by other members of…
We study fairness in social choice settings under single-peaked preferences. Construction and characterization of social choice rules in the single-peaked domain has been extensively studied in prior works. In fact, in the single-peaked…
We study fairness in the allocation of discrete goods. Exactly fair (envy-free) allocations are impossible, so we discuss notions of approximate fairness. In particular, we focus on allocations in which the swap of two items serves to…
The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of…
A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If we consider the objects as indivisible, many instances of the decision problem: ``Is there a fair division of the objects…
We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete and transitive ranking. We adapt envy-freeness,…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
In the assignment problem, the goal is to assign indivisible items to agents who have ordinal preferences, efficiently and fairly, in a strategyproof manner. In practice, first-choice maximality, i.e., assigning a maximal number of agents…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how a joint reward should be shared among them. We focus on settings where the share that each agent receives depends on the subjective opinions of its peers concerning that agent's…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible resources among agents. Most prior work focuses on fairness and/or efficiency among agents. However, the allocator, as the resource owner, may also be involved in many scenarios (e.g., government…
We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…
We study the problem of allocating homogeneous and indivisible objects among agents with money. In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and…
We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy,…
Fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute $m$ goods to $n$ agents in a "fair" manner, where every agent has a valuation for each subset of goods. We assume general…
In the allocation of indivisible goods, a prominent fairness notion is envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). We initiate the study of reachability problems in fair division by investigating the problem of whether one EF1 allocation can be…
We consider the problem of dividing limited resources to individuals arriving over $T$ rounds. Each round has a random number of individuals arrive, and individuals can be characterized by their type (i.e. preferences over the different…