Related papers: Equity in strategic exchange
We study the problem of distributing a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations in a $\mathit{fair}$ manner. The fairness notion under consideration is Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). Despite significant efforts by…
In the fair division of items among interested agents, envy-freeness is possibly the most favoured and widely studied formalisation of fairness. For indivisible items, envy-free allocations may not exist in trivial cases, and hence research…
Fairness in language models is typically studied as a property of a single, centrally optimized model. As large language models become increasingly agentic, we propose that fairness emerges through interaction and exchange. We study this…
Fair division of indivisible items is a well-studied topic in Economics and Computer Science. The objective is to allocate items to agents in a fair manner, where each agent has a valuation for each subset of items. Envy-freeness is one of…
Fairness is desirable yet challenging to achieve within multi-agent systems, especially when agents differ in latent traits that affect their abilities. This hidden heterogeneity often leads to unequal distributions of wealth, even when…
We consider the age-old problem of allocating items among different agents in a way that is efficient and fair. Two papers, by Dolev et al. and Ghodsi et al., have recently studied this problem in the context of computer systems. Both…
Fair division mechanisms for indivisible goods require agent orderings to deterministically select one allocation when running the algorithm in practice. We introduce position envy-freeness up to one good (PEF1) as a fairness criterion for…
We study the design of optimal incentives in sequential processes. To do so, we consider a basic and fundamental model in which an agent initiates a value-creating sequential process through costly investment with random success. If…
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous and indivisible goods among strategic agents, with preferences over subsets of goods, when there is no medium of exchange. This model captures the well studied problem of fair allocation…
In the problem of fully allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, the equal division guarantee,…
We consider the fair division of indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive non-negative normalized valuations, with the goal of obtaining high value guarantees, that is, close to the proportional share for each agent. We prove that…
The issue of fairness in AI arises from discriminatory practices in applications like job recommendations and risk assessments, emphasising the need for algorithms that do not discriminate based on group characteristics. This concern is…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that…
Envy-freeness is a widely studied notion in resource allocation, capturing some aspects of fairness. The notion of envy being inherently subjective though, it might be the case that an agent envies another agent, but that she objectively…
Strategic learning studies how decision rules interact with agents who may strategically change their inputs/features to achieve better outcomes. In standard settings, models assume that the decision-maker's sole scope is to learn a…
We consider settings where an uninformed principal must hear arguments from two better-informed agents, corresponding to two possible courses of action that they argue for. The arguments are verifiable in the sense that the true state of…
We study the problem of fair online resource allocation via non-monetary mechanisms, where multiple agents repeatedly share a resource without monetary transfers. Previous work has shown that every agent can guarantee $1/2$ of their ideal…
In dynamic settings each economic agent's choices can be revealing of her private information. This elicitation via the rationalization of observable behavior depends each agent's perception of which payoff-relevant contingencies other…
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most…
We introduce a new model for two-sided matching which allows us to borrow popular fairness notions from the fair division literature such as envy-freeness up to one good and maximin share guarantee. In our model, each agent is matched to…