Related papers: Efficient Mechanisms under Unawareness
Capacity expansion models are frequently used to inform multi-billion dollar grid infrastructure decisions, a context in which there is significant uncertainty surrounding the future need for and performance of such infrastructure. However,…
In this paper, we study decentralized decision-making where agents optimize private objectives under incomplete information and imperfect public monitoring, in a non-cooperative setting. By shaping utilities-embedding shadow prices or…
We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even when players participate in multiple different mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define the class of smooth mechanisms, related to smooth…
We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately efficient allocations. The role of interaction in markets has received significant attention in economic thinking, e.g. in Hayek's 1945 classic paper. We…
Algorithmic decision making systems are ubiquitous across a wide variety of online as well as offline services. These systems rely on complex learning methods and vast amounts of data to optimize the service functionality, satisfaction of…
In traditional mechanism design, agents only care about the utility they derive from the outcome of the mechanism. We look at a richer model where agents also assign non-negative dis-utility to the information about their private types…
This study proposes a new efficiency requirement, a minimal almost weak Pareto principle, which says that x is socially better than y whenever the only one individual never prefers y to x, and all the others prefers x to y. Then, I show…
This paper addresses the challenge of model uncertainty in quantitative finance, where decisions in portfolio allocation, derivative pricing, and risk management rely on estimating stochastic models from limited data. In practice, the…
Market efficiency at least requires the absence of weak arbitrage opportunities, but this is not sufficient to establish a situation where the market is sensitive, i.e., where it "fully reflects" or "rapidly adjusts to" some information…
This paper studies the design of mechanisms that are robust to misspecification. We introduce a novel notion of robustness that connects a variety of disparate approaches and study its implications in a wide class of mechanism design…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed market-based resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines…
We study dynamic mechanism design in a pure-exchange economy with privately observed idiosyncratic income. In the standard infinitely lived hidden-income benchmark of Green (1987) and Thomas-Worrall (1990), constrained-efficient allocations…
The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Unfortunately, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget…
How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…
We study the efficiency of mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource. Given scalar signals submitted by all users, such a mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that each user will receive and a payment that will be collected…
Fair machine learning (ML) methods help identify and mitigate the risk that algorithms encode or automate social injustices. Algorithmic approaches alone cannot resolve structural inequalities, but they can support socio-technical decision…
Renewable power sources have low marginal pro-duction costs, but may result in high balancing costs due to the inherent production uncertainty. Current day-ahead markets elicit only point production profiles and neglect the degree of…
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource…
We review the reasoning underlying two approaches to combination of sensory uncertainties. First approach is noncommittal, making no assumptions about properties of uncertainty or parameters of stimulation. Then we explain the relationship…