Related papers: Efficient Mechanisms under Unawareness
We study efficiency and budget balance for designing mechanisms in general quasi-linear domains. Green and Laffont (1979) proved that one cannot generically achieve both. We consider strategyproof budget-balanced mechanisms that are…
Evidence-based decision-making entails collecting (costly) observations about an underlying phenomenon of interest, and subsequently committing to an (informed) decision on the basis of accumulated evidence. In this setting, active sensing…
In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers through the buyers' network. In single-item auctions, we show that no mechanism is…
This paper deals with solving distributed optimization problems with equality constraints by a class of uncertain nonlinear heterogeneous dynamic multi-agent systems. It is assumed that each agent with an uncertain dynamic model has limited…
Load shedding is usually the last resort to balance generation and demand to maintain stable operation of the electric grid after major disturbances. Current load-shedding optimization practices focus mainly on the physical optimality of…
We analyze a principal-agent procurement problem in which the principal (she) is unaware some of the marginal cost types of the agent (he). Communication arises naturally as some types of the agent may have an incentive to raise the…
We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy,…
Algorithmic fairness has grown rapidly as a research area, yet key concepts remain unsettled, especially in criminal justice. We review group, individual, and process fairness and map the conditions under which they conflict. We then…
Many network resource allocation problems can be viewed as allocating a divisible resource, where the allocations are constrained to lie in a polymatroid. We consider market-based mechanisms for such problems. Though the…
Our goal is to design distributed coordination strategies that enable agents to achieve global performance guarantees while minimizing the energy cost of their actions with an emphasis on feasibility for real-time implementation. As a…
Despite the importance of this variable in the macroeconomic context, current research on job insecurity remains mainly confined to its non-systemic dimension. The research aim of this paper is to identify the short-run and long-run…
In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…
Consider the following collective choice problem: a group of budget constrained agents must choose one of several alternatives. Is there a budget balanced mechanism that: i) does not depend on the specific characteristics of the group, ii)…
This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a…
One of the most important empirical findings in microeconometrics is the pervasiveness of heterogeneity in economic behaviour (cf. Heckman 2001). This paper shows that cumulative distribution functions and quantiles of the nonparametric…
When ignorance due to the lack of knowledge, modeled as epistemic uncertainty using Dempster-Shafer structures on closed intervals, is present in the model parameters, a new uncertainty propagation method is necessary to propagate both…
In mainstream neoclassical economics, utility maximization is the only engine of individual action, and the other or the social, if it is modeled for decisions deemed fundamental, it is done as a tacit externality parameter affecting an…
Ad hoc architectures have emerged as a valuable alternative to centralized participatory sensing systems due to their infrastructureless nature, which ensures good availability, easy maintenance and direct user communication. As a result,…
The seminal impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) states that for bilateral trade, there is no mechanism that is individually rational (IR), incentive compatible (IC), weakly budget balanced, and efficient. This has led…
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…