Related papers: Revealed Bayesian Persuasion
When people choose what messages to send to others, they often consider how others will interpret the messages. A sender may expect a receiver to engage in motivated reasoning, leading the receiver to trust good news more than bad news,…
We focus on the scenario in which an agent can exploit his information advantage to manipulate the outcome of an election. In particular, we study district-based elections with two candidates, in which the winner of the election is the…
This paper characterizes the conditions under which the observed beliefs of a group of agents are consistent with Bayesian updating. Beliefs are consistent with Bayesianism if they arise from the application of Bayes' rule given some…
In causal inference, and specifically in the \textit{Causes of Effects} problem, one is interested in how to use statistical evidence to understand causation in an individual case, and so how to assess the so-called {\em probability of…
Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to account for almost a third of all economic activity in…
Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-receiver model by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), in which there…
Bayesian persuasion is the study of information sharing policies among strategic agents. A prime example is signaling in online ad auctions: what information should a platform signal to an advertiser regarding a user when selling the…
Motivated reasoning posits that people distort how they process information in the direction of beliefs they find attractive. This paper creates a novel experimental design to identify motivated reasoning from Bayesian updating when people…
Information design is typically studied through the lens of Bayesian signaling, where signals shape beliefs purely based on their correlation with the true state of the world. However, behavioral economics and psychology emphasize that…
We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form…
A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private information about the maximal number of additional experiments…
We consider a dynamic Bayesian persuasion setting where a single long-lived sender persuades a stream of ``short-lived'' agents (receivers) by sharing information about a payoff-relevant state. The state transitions are Markovian and the…
We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and a corresponding positive or negative payoff, or to refrain.…
Bayesian persuasion studies the problem faced by an informed sender who strategically discloses information to influence the behavior of an uninformed receiver. Recently, a growing attention has been devoted to settings where the sender and…
In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…
We study a long-run persuasion problem where a long-lived Sender repeatedly interacts with a sequence of short-lived Receivers who may adopt a misspecified model for belief updating. The Sender commits to a stationary information structure,…
We frame dynamic persuasion in a partial observation stochastic control Leader-Follower game with an ergodic criterion. The Receiver controls the dynamics of a multidimensional unobserved state process. Information is provided to the…
An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent…
Recent decades have seen an interest in prediction problems for which Bayesian methodology has been used ubiquitously. Sampling from or approximating the posterior predictive distribution in a Bayesian model allows one to make inferential…
We propose a model of causal persuasion, in which a sender selectively discloses a set of variables together with their true joint distribution and proposes a subjective causal model that binds them. A receiver is persuaded by this model…