Related papers: Equilibrium with non-convex preferences: some insi…

We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling, cloud…

We study the problem of determining an envy-free allocation of indivisible goods among multiple agents with additive valuations. EFX, which stands for envy-freeness up to any good, is a well-studied relaxation of the envy-free allocation…

We consider continuous-time consensus systems whose interactions satisfy a form or reciprocity that is not instantaneous, but happens over time. We show that these systems have certain desirable properties: They always converge…

Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit…

We define the model of an abstract economy with private information and a countable set of actions. We generalize the H. Yu and Z. Zhang's model (2007), considering that each agent is characterised by a preference correspondence instead of…

We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…

In this paper we propose to use elements of the mathematical formalism of Quantum Mechanics to capture the idea that agents' preferences, in addition to being typically uncertain, can also be indeterminate. They are determined (i.e.,…

We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…

Equilibrium computation in markets usually considers settings where player valuation functions are known. We consider the setting where player valuations are unknown; using a PAC learning-theoretic framework, we analyze some classes of…

The notion that economies should normally be in equilibrium is by now well-established; equally well-established is that economies are almost never precisely in equilibrium. Using a very general formulation, we show that under dynamics that…

Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a classic solution to the problem of fair and efficient allocation of goods [Foley'67, Varian'74]. Every agent receives an equal budget of artificial currency with which to purchase…

We apply the convection stability criterion to a fluid in global thermodynamic equilibrium with a rigid rotation or with a constant acceleration along the streamlines. Different equations of state describing strongly interacting matter are…

We study the complexity of finding a Walrasian equilibrium in markets where the agents have $k$-demand valuations. These valuations are an extension of unit-demand valuations where a bundle's value is the maximum of its $k$-subsets' values.…

When allocating indivisible resources or tasks, an envy-free allocation or equitable allocation may not exist. We present a sufficient condition and an algorithm to achieve envy-freeness and equitability when monetary transfers are allowed.…

With recent development of artificial intelligence, it is more common to adopt AI agents in economic activities. This paper explores the economic actions of agents, including human agents and AI agents, in an economic game of trading…

To determine the welfare implications of price changes in demand data, we introduce a revealed preference relation over prices. We show that the absence of cycles in this relation characterizes a consumer who trades off the utility of…

We study risk-sharing economies where heterogenous agents trade subject to quadratic transaction costs. The corresponding equilibrium asset prices and trading strategies are characterised by a system of nonlinear, fully-coupled…

We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…

We investigate a voting scenario with two groups of agents whose preferences depend on a ground truth that cannot be directly observed. The majority's preferences align with the ground truth, while the minorities disagree. Focusing on…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible items under relevance constraints, where each agent has a set of relevant items and can only receive items that are relevant to them. While the relevance constraint has been studied in recent…