Related papers: Equilibrium with non-convex preferences: some insi…

Mechanisms with money are commonly designed under the assumption that agents are quasi-linear, meaning they have linear disutility for spending money. We study the implications when agents with non-linear (specifically, convex) disutility…

We prove an existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider…

This paper investigates the equilibrium portfolio selection for smooth ambiguity preferences in a continuous-time market. The investor is uncertain about the risky asset's drift term and updates the subjective belief according to the…

We consider two risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of an illiquid indivisible contingent claim in an incomplete semimartingale market environment. Under the assumption that the agents are exponential utility maximizers…

We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…

In contrast to common opinion, it is shown that equilibrium constants determine the time-dependent behavior of particular ratios of concentrations for any system of reversible first-order reactions. Indeed, some special ratios actually…

In this work, we develop an equilibrium model for price formation of securities in a market composed of two populations of different types: the first one consists of cooperative agents, while the other one consists of non-cooperative…

Existence of an increasing quasi-concave value function consistent with given preference information is an important issue in various fields including Economics, Multiple Criteria Decision Making, and Applied Mathematics. In this paper, we…

In this paper I discuss truthful equilibria in common agency models. Specifically, I provide general conditions under which truthful equilibria are plausible, easy to calculate and efficient. These conditions generalize similar results in…

We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…

In this paper, we consider the revealed preferences problem from a learning perspective. Every day, a price vector and a budget is drawn from an unknown distribution, and a rational agent buys his most preferred bundle according to some…

We study the problem of finding an envy-free allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. We focus on the fairness notion of envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). A central open question in fair division is whether…

We consider two sided matching markets consisting of agents with non-transferable utilities; agents from the opposite sides form matching pairs (e.g., buyers-sellers) and negotiate the terms of their math which may include a monetary…

We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities, e.g., labor and rental housing markets, in which money can exchange hands between agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations.…

The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…

This paper studies convex duality in optimal investment and contingent claim valuation in markets where traded assets may be subject to nonlinear trading costs and portfolio constraints. Under fairly general conditions, the dual expressions…

We consider an investor who, while maximizing his/her expected utility, also compares the outcome to a reference entity. We recall the notion of personal equilibrium and show that, in a multistep, generically incomplete financial market…

The quasi-variational inequalities play a significant role in analyzing a wide range of real-world problems. However, these problems are more complicated to solve than variational inequalities as the constraint set is based on the current…

We prove that a first-order cooperative system of interacting agents converges to consensus if the so-called Persistence Excitation condition holds. This condition requires that the interaction function between any pair of agents satisfies…

We consider stability concepts for random matchings where agents have preferences over objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic, the standard stability concept also captures the fairness property…