Related papers: A Linear Programming Approach to the Super-Stable …
The goal of this work is to identify steady-state solutions to dynamical systems defined on large, random families of networks. We do so by passing to a continuum limit where the adjacency matrix is replaced by a non-local operator with…
We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph $G=(N,E)$, with an integer vertex capacity function $b$ and an edge weighting $w$. The set $N$ consists of a number of…
Linear complementarity problems provide a powerful framework to model nonsmooth phenomena in a variety of real-world applications. In dynamical control systems, they appear coupled to a linear input-output system in the form of linear…
We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a…
We develop a comprehensive theory of the stable representation categories of several sequences of groups, including the classical and symmetric groups, and their relation to the unstable categories. An important component of this theory is…
Let $L$ be any finite distributive lattice and $B$ be any boolean predicate defined on $L$ such that the set of elements satisfying $B$ is a sublattice of $L$. Consider any subset $M$ of $L$ of size $k$ of elements of $L$ that satisfy $B$.…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
Let G be a finite graph with the non-k-order property (essentially, a uniform finite bound on the size of an induced sub-half-graph). A major result of the paper applies model-theoretic arguments to obtain a stronger version of…
Let $p_n$ denote the probability that a random instance of the stable roommates problem of size $n$ admits a solution. We derive an explicit formula for $p_n$ and compute exact values of $p_n$ for $n\leq 12$.
This paper considers the problem of testing whether there exists a non-negative solution to a possibly under-determined system of linear equations with known coefficients. This hypothesis testing problem arises naturally in a number of…
In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the stable matching problem. In particular, we consider the setting where preferences may contain ties. For this generalization, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem…
We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier and investigate other implications. We give…
We propose a new integer programming formulation for the problem of finding a maximum stable set of a graph based on representatives of stable sets. In addition, we investigate exact solutions provided by a Lagrangian decomposition of this…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
Motivated by the increasing interest in the explicit representation and handling of various "preference" structures arising in modern digital economy, this work introduces a new class of "one-to-many stable-matching" problems where a set of…
We prove that the Kuramoto model on a graph can contain infinitely many non-equivalent stable equilibria. More precisely, we prove that for every positive integer d there is a connected graph such that the set of stable equilibria contains…
Efficient computability is an important property of solution concepts in matching markets. We consider the computational complexity of finding and verifying various solution concepts in trading networks-multi-sided matching markets with…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S) involves assigning students to projects based on student preferences over projects, lecturer preferences over students, and the maximum number of…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…