Related papers: Resolving Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox

The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox stands as the most profound divergence between frequentist and Bayesian approaches to hypothesis testing. Yet despite more than six decades of discussion, this paradox remains frequently misunderstood--even in…

The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox exposes a rift between Bayesian and frequentist hypothesis testing that strikes at the heart of statistical inference. Contrary to what most current literature suggests, the paradox was central to the Bayesian…

The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox displays how the use of a p-value (or number of standard deviations z) in a frequentist hypothesis test can lead to an inference that is radically different from that of a Bayesian hypothesis test in the form…

This paper discusses the dual interpretation of the Jeffreys--Lindley's paradox associated with Bayesian posterior probabilities and Bayes factors, both as a differentiation between frequentist and Bayesian statistics and as a pointer to…

This paper is concerned with the well known Jeffreys-Lindley paradox. In a Bayesian set up, the so-called paradox arises when a point null hypothesis is tested and an objective prior is sought for the alternative hypothesis. In particular,…

In 1957, Lindley published "A statistical paradox" in Biometrika, revealing a fundamental conflict between frequentist and Bayesian inference as sample size approaches infinity. We present a new paradox of a different kind: a conflict…

There are three principle paradigms of statistics: Bayesian, frequentist and information-based inference. Although these paradigms are in agreement in some contexts, the Lindley paradox describes a class of problems, models of unknown…

The so-called Lindley paradox is a counterintuitive statistical effect where the Bayesian and frequentist approaches to hypothesis testing give radically different answers, depending on the choice of the prior distribution. In this paper we…

In many common situations, a Bayesian credible interval will be, given the same data, very similar to a frequentist confidence interval, and researchers will interpret these intervals in a similar fashion. However, no predictable similarity…

We consider the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox from an objective Bayesian perspective by attempting to find priors representing complete indifference to sample size in the problem. This means that we ensure that the prior for the unknown mean and…

In the hypothesis testing framework, p-value is often computed to determine rejection of the null hypothesis or not. On the other hand, Bayesian approaches typically compute the posterior probability of the null hypothesis to evaluate its…

Frequentist (classical) and the Bayesian approaches to the construction of confidence limits are compared. Various examples which illustrate specific problems are presented. The Likelihood Principle and the Stopping Rule Paradox are…

It has long been known that for the comparison of pairwise nested models, a decision based on the Bayes factor produces a consistent model selector (in the frequentist sense). Here we go beyond the usual consistency for nested pairwise…

Bayesian and frequentist methods differ in many aspects, but share some basic optimality properties. In practice, there are situations in which one of the methods is more preferred by some criteria. We consider the case of inference about a…

Standard statistical theory has arguably proved to be unsuitable as a basis for constructing a satisfactory completely general framework for performing statistical inference. For example, frequentist theory has never come close to providing…

There are two main opposing schools of statistical reasoning, Frequentist and Bayesian approaches. Until recent days, the frequentist or classical approach has dominated the scientific research, but Bayesianism has reappeared with a strong…

This paper presents a brief, semi-technical comparison of the essential features of the frequentist and Bayesian approaches to statistical inference, with several illustrative examples implemented in Python. The differences between…

We marshall the arguments for preferring Bayesian hypothesis testing and confidence sets to frequentist ones. We define admissible solutions to inference problems, noting that Bayesian solutions are admissible. We give seven weaker…

Bayesian, frequentist and fiducial (BFF) inferences are much more congruous than they have been perceived historically in the scientific community (cf., Reid and Cox 2015; Kass 2011; Efron 1998). Most practitioners are probably more…

Estimating the difference between two binomial proportions will be investigated, where Bayesian, frequentist and fiducial (BFF) methods will be considered. Three vague priors will be used, the Jeffreys prior, a divergence prior and the…