Related papers: Stable Task Allocation in Multi-Agent Systems with…
Allocating indivisible items among a set of agents is a frequently studied discrete optimization problem. In the setting considered in this work, the agents' preferences over the items are assumed to be identical. We consider a very recent…
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on stable partitions, we extend his results to this significantly…
Constrained multi-agent reinforcement learning offers the framework to design scalable and almost surely feasible solutions for teams of agents operating in dynamic environments to carry out conflicting tasks. We address the challenges of…
The tasks that an agent will need to solve often are not known during training. However, if the agent knows which properties of the environment are important then, after learning how its actions affect those properties, it may be able to…
The theory of optimal choice sets offers a well-established solution framework in social choice and game theory. In social choice theory, decision-making is typically modeled as a maximization problem. However, when preferences are cyclic…
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…
We study the problem of assigning agents to the vertices of a graph such that no pair of neighbors can benefit from swapping assignments -- a property we term neighborhood stability. We further assume that agents' utilities are based solely…
In this paper we present a deeper analysis than has previously been carried out of a selective attention problem, and the evolution of continuous-time recurrent neural networks to solve it. We show that the task has a rich structure, and…
Traditional task assignment approaches for multi-agent motion control do not take the possibility of collisions into account. This can lead to challenging requirements for path planning. We derive an assignment method that not only…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…
In the Stable Roommates Problem (SR), a set of $2n$ agents rank one another in a linear order. The goal is to find a matching that is stable: one that has no pair of agents who mutually prefer each other over their assigned partners. We…
The multi-agent spatial coverage control problem encompasses a broad research domain, dealing with both dynamic and static deployment strategies, discrete-task assignments, and spatial distribution-matching deployment. Coverage control may…
We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…
In the stable allocation problem on a two-sided market introduced and studied by Baiou and Balinski in the early 2000's, one is given a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ with capacities $b$ on the edges (``contracts'') and quotas $q$ on the…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…
We consider a scenario in which leaders are required to recruit teams of followers. Each leader cannot recruit all followers, but interaction is constrained according to a bipartite network. The objective for each leader is to reach a state…
We consider the problem of decomposing a global task assigned to a multi-agent system, expressed as a formula within a fragment of Signal Temporal Logic (STL), under range-limited communication. Given a global task expressed as a…
I relate bipartite graph matchings to stable matchings. I prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saturating stable matching, where every agent on one side is matched, for all possible preferences. I extend my…