Related papers: Construction of Compromise Values for Cooperative …
Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. In this paper we study…
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…
This paper studies multiplayer turn-based games on graphs in which player preferences are modeled as $\omega$-automatic relations given by deterministic parity automata. This contrasts with most existing work, which focuses on specific…
In this paper we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility cooperative games with a priori unions. In the case of the equal…
This paper concerns the analysis of the Shapley value in matching games. Matching games constitute a fundamental class of cooperative games which help understand and model auctions and assignments. In a matching game, the value of a…
We show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into a sum of component games, one for each player, using the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a graph. This decomposition is shown to satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry,…
Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation among self-interested agents. They offer a number of solution concepts describing how the outcome of the cooperation should be shared among the players. Unfortunately, computational…
This study introduces the \emph{edge-based Shapley value}, a novel allocation rule within cooperative game theory, specifically tailored for networked systems, where value is generated through interactions represented by edges. Traditional…
This paper explores a PAC (probably approximately correct) learning model in cooperative games. Specifically, we are given $m$ random samples of coalitions and their values, taken from some unknown cooperative game; can we predict the…
The Shapley value is arguably the most central normative solution concept in cooperative game theory. It specifies a unique way in which the reward from cooperation can be "fairly" divided among players. While it has a wide range of real…
A \emph{bidding} game is played on a graph as follows. A token is placed on an initial vertex and both players are allocated budgets. In each turn, the players simultaneously submit bids that do not exceed their available budgets, the…
The Owen value is an well-known allocation rule for cooperative games with coalition structure.In this paper, we introduce the concept of highly mutually dependent unions. Two unions in a cooperative game with coalition structure are said…
Classical objectives in two-player zero-sum games played on graphs often deal with limit behaviors of infinite plays: e.g., mean-payoff and total-payoff in the quantitative setting, or parity in the qualitative one (a canonical way to…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
In this paper we introduce the $\Gamma$ value, a new value for cooperative games with transferable utility. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the $\Gamma$ value based on a property concerning the so-called necessary players.…
In the classical context, the cooperative game theory concept of the Shapley value has been adapted for post hoc explanations of machine learning models. However, this approach does not easily translate to eXplainable Quantum ML (XQML).…
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…
In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive…
Objective: The study investigates the effect on cooperation in multiplayer games, when the population from which all individuals are drawn is structured - i.e. when a given individual is only competing with a small subset of the entire…
Many important values for cooperative games are known to arise from least square optimization problems. The present investigation develops an optimization framework to explain and clarify this phenomenon in a general setting. The main…