Related papers: On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness an…

Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences. One barrier that might exist to such manipulation is computational…

Diffusion mechanism design, which investigate how to incentivise agents to invite as many colleagues to a multi-agent decision making as possible, is a new research paradigm at the intersection between microeconomics and computer science.…

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability that was proposed by…

The guarantee of an anonymous mechanism is the worst case welfare an agent can secure against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? We address the worst case design…

In this study, we introduced a probabilistic voter, regarding symbol probabilities in decision process besides majority consensus. Conventional majority voter is independent of functionality of redundant modules. In our study, proposed…

Observing electronic voting from an international point of view gives some perspective about its genesis and evolution. An analysis of the voting process through its cultural, ontological, legal and political dimensions explains the…

We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…

To preserve voter secrecy on untrusted voter devices we propose to use short voting codes. This ensures voting codes remain practical even if the voter is able to select multiple voting choices. We embed the mechanism in a protocol that…

We initiate the study of voting rules for participatory budgeting using the so-called epistemic approach, where one interprets votes as noisy reflections of some ground truth regarding the objectively best set of projects to fund. Using…

Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process…

Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical results suggest that this complexity may only be in the worst-case…

We consider the problem of locating a single facility on a vertex in a given graph based on agents' preferences, where the domain of the preferences is either single-peaked or single-dipped. Our main interest is the existence of…

Secure E-voting is a challenging protocol. Several approaches based on homomorphic crypto systems, mix-nets blind signatures are proposed in the literature .But most of them need complicated homomorphic encryption which involves complicated…

Fairness concerns about algorithmic decision-making systems have been mainly focused on the outputs (e.g., the accuracy of a classifier across individuals or groups). However, one may additionally be concerned with fairness in the inputs.…

A safety verification task involves verifying a system against a desired safety property under certain assumptions about the environment. However, these environmental assumptions may occasionally be violated due to modeling errors or…

Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and…

A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal utility functions over the alternatives, but voting rules have…

We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters, that is, we consider the parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections with respect to the number of voters as a parameter. We consider…

Manipulation is a problem of fundamental importance in the context of voting in which the voters exercise their votes strategically instead of voting honestly to prevent selection of an alternative that is less preferred. The…

We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordinal preferences over the alternatives. We consider several voting mechanisms: plurality voting and approval voting with deterministic or uniform tie-breaking rules. We…