Related papers: Proportionality in Thumbs Up and Down Voting
A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal utility functions over the alternatives, but voting rules have…
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from…
Proportional representation plays a crucial role in electoral systems. In ordinal elections, where voters rank candidates based on their preferences, the Single Transferable Vote (STV) is the most widely used proportional voting method. STV…
In social choice there often arises a conflict between the majority principle (the search for a candidate that is as good as possible for as many voters as possible), and the protection of minority rights (choosing a candidate that is not…
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one…
Voting systems typically treat all voters equally. We argue that perhaps they should not: Voters who have supported good choices in the past should be given higher weight than voters who have supported bad ones. To develop a formal…
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…
We analyze Assessment Voting, a new two-round voting procedure that can be applied to binary decisions in democratic societies. In the first round, a randomly-selected number of citizens cast their vote on one of the two alternatives at…
Voting algorithms have been widely used as consensus protocols in the realization of fault-tolerant systems. These algorithms are best suited for distributed systems of nodes with low computational power or heterogeneous networks, where…
Voting methods are instrumental design elements of democracies. Citizens use them to express and aggregate their preferences to reach a collective decision. However, voting outcomes can be as sensitive to voting rules as they are to…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
We study the problem of selecting a statement that finds common ground across diverse population preferences. Generative AI is uniquely suited for this task because it can access a practically infinite set of statements, but AI systems like…
This paper investigates the voting behaviors of Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically GPT-4 and LLaMA-2, their biases, and how they align with human voting patterns. Our methodology involved using a dataset from a human voting…
Winner selection by majority, in an election between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with democratic principles. Instead, when the candidates are three or more and the voters rank candidates in order of preference, there are no…
Societies often rely on human experts to take a wide variety of decisions affecting their members, from jail-or-release decisions taken by judges and stop-and-frisk decisions taken by police officers to accept-or-reject decisions taken by…
Voting is a very general method of preference aggregation. A voting rule takes as input every voter's vote (typically, a ranking of the alternatives), and produces as output either just the winning alternative or a ranking of the…
Foundation models such as GPT-4 are fine-tuned to avoid unsafe or otherwise problematic behavior, such as helping to commit crimes or producing racist text. One approach to fine-tuning, called reinforcement learning from human feedback,…
We study situations where a group of voters need to take a collective decision over a number of public issues, with the goal of getting a result that reflects the voters' opinions in a proportional manner. Our focus is on interconnected…
We contribute to the programme of lifting proportionality axioms from the multi-winner voting setting to participatory budgeting. We define novel proportionality axioms for participatory budgeting and test them on known…
In this paper we develop a novel approach to relaxing Arrow's axioms for voting rules, addressing a long-standing critique in social choice theory. Classical axioms (often styled as fairness axioms or fairness criteria) are assessed in a…