Related papers: Analyzing the Impact of AC False Data Injection At…
Security issues have gathered growing interest within the control systems community, as physical components and communication networks are increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks. In this context, recent literature has studied increasingly…
The cybersecurity of microgrid has received widespread attentions due to the frequently reported attack accidents against distributed energy resource (DER) manufactures. Numerous impact mitigation schemes have been proposed to reduce or…
In this paper, we consider a hierarchical control based DC microgrid (DCmG) equipped with unknown input observer (UIO) based detectors, where the potential false data injection (FDI) attacks and the distributed countermeasure are…
Influenced by deep penetration of the new generation of information technology, power systems have gradually evolved into highly coupled cyber-physical systems (CPS). Among many possible power CPS network attacks, a false data injection…
In this paper a new class of cyber attacks against state estimation in the electric power grid is considered. This class of attacks is named false data injection attacks. We show that with the knowledge of the system configuration an…
The security of energy supply in a power grid critically depends on the ability to accurately estimate the state of the system. However, manipulated power flow measurements can potentially hide overloads and bypass the bad data detection…
Recent studies have considered thwarting false data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation in power grids by proactively perturbing branch susceptances. This approach is known as moving target defense (MTD). However, despite of…
To enhance the robustness of cooperative driving to cyberattacks, we study a controller-oriented approach to mitigate the effect of a class of False-Data Injection (FDI) attacks. By reformulating a given dynamic Cooperative Adaptive Cruise…
Cyber data attacks are the worst-case interacting bad data to power system state estimation and cannot be detected by existing bad data detectors. In this paper, we for the first time analyze the likelihood of cyber data attacks by…
Data analysis and monitoring on smart grids are jeopardized by attacks on cyber-physical systems. False data injection attack (FDIA) is one of the classes of those attacks that target the smart measurement devices by injecting malicious…
As power systems evolve with increased integration of renewable energy sources, they become more complex and vulnerable to both cyber and physical threats. This study validates a centralized Dynamic State Estimation (DSE) algorithm designed…
This paper presents a hybrid data-driven physics model-based framework for real time monitoring in smart grids. As the power grid transitions to the use of smart grid technology, it's real time monitoring becomes more vulnerable to cyber…
This paper addresses the problem of detecting false data injection (FDI) attacks in a distributed network without a fusion center, represented by a connected graph among multiple agent nodes. Each agent node is equipped with a sensor, and…
Training and evaluating false data injection attack (FDIA) detectors for power systems is constrained by data scarcity. Operational grid measurements are commercially sensitive, and hand-crafted attacks fail to capture complex…
A new mechanism aimed at misleading a power system control center about the source of a data attack is proposed. As a man-in-the-middle state attack, a data framing attack is proposed to exploit the bad data detection and identification…
This paper studies the performance and resilience of a cyber-physical control system (CPCS) with attack detection and reactive attack mitigation. It addresses the problem of deriving an optimal sequence of false data injection attacks that…
The normal operation of power system relies on accurate state estimation that faithfully reflects the physical aspects of the electrical power grids. However, recent research shows that carefully synthesized false-data injection attacks can…
Fast and accurate detection of cyberattacks is a key element for a cyber-resilient power system. Recently, data-driven detectors and physics-based Moving Target Defences (MTD) have been proposed to detect false data injection (FDI) attacks…
False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) pose a significant threat to smart grid infrastructures, particularly Home Area Networks (HANs), where real-time monitoring and control are highly adopted. Owing to the comparatively less stringent…
Recently, moving target defence (MTD) has been proposed to thwart false data injection (FDI) attacks in power system state estimation by proactively triggering the distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. One of the…