Related papers: Analyzing the Impact of AC False Data Injection At…
State estimation is of considerable significance for the power system operation and control. However, well-designed false data injection attacks can utilize blind spots in conventional residual-based bad data detection methods to manipulate…
Most traditional false data injection attack (FDIA) detection approaches rely on a key assumption, i.e., the power system can be accurately modeled. However, the transmission line parameters are dynamic and cannot be accurately known during…
Smart grids are inherently susceptible to various types of malicious cyberattacks that have all been documented in the recent literature. Traditional cybersecurity research on power systems often utilizes simplified models that fail to…
Reliable grid operation depends on accurate and timely telemetry, making modern power systems vulnerable to communication layer cyberattacks. This paper evaluates how Denial of Service (DoS), Denial of Data (DoD), and False Data Injection…
The integration of information and physical systems in modern power grids has heightened vulnerabilities to False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), threatening the secure operation of power cyber-physical systems (CPS). This paper reviews…
The false data injection (FDI) attack cannot be detected by the traditional anomaly detection techniques used in the energy system state estimators. In this paper, we demonstrate how FDI attacks can be constructed blindly, i.e., without…
Modern electric power grid, known as the Smart Grid, has fast transformed the isolated and centrally controlled power system to a fast and massively connected cyber-physical system that benefits from the revolutions happening in the…
Robotic systems are vulnerable to False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), where adversaries corrupt sensor signals to gain malicious control. Feedback linearization exposes robotic systems to integrator vulnerability, making them susceptible…
False data injection attacks (FDIAs) pose a persistent challenge to AC power system state estimation. In current practice, detection relies primarily on topology-aware residual-based tests that assume malicious measurements can be…
Modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are often designed as networked, software-based controller implementations which have been found to be vulnerable to network-level and physical level attacks. A number of research works have proposed…
This work studies the modeling of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) in integrated electricity-gas systems (IEGSs). First, we introduce a static state estimation model and bad data detection method for IEGSs. Then, we develop FDIAs on…
False data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks on power systems can be prevented by strategically selecting and protecting a sufficiently large measurement subset, which, however, requires adequate cyber-defense resources for measurement…
recent literature has proposed various detection and identification methods for FDIAs, but few studies have focused on a solution that would prevent such attacks from occurring. However, great strides have been made using deep learning to…
False data injection attacks (FDIAs) pose a significant security threat to power system state estimation. To detect such attacks, recent studies have proposed machine learning (ML) techniques, particularly deep neural networks (DNNs).…
Cyberattack susceptibilities are introduced as the communication requirement increases with the incorporation of more renewable energy sources into DC microgrids. Parallel DC-DC converters are utilized to provide high current and supply the…
We study the security threats of power system operation brought by a class of data injection attacks upon load forecasting algorithms. In particular, with minimal assumptions on the knowledge and ability of the attacker, we design attack…
Cybersecurity in building energy management is crucial for protecting infrastructure, ensuring data integrity, and preventing unauthorized access or manipulation. This paper investigates the energy efficiency and cybersecurity of building…
Recent studies have demonstrated that smart grids are vulnerable to stealthy false data injection attacks (SFDIAs), as SFDIAs can bypass residual-based bad data detection mechanisms. The SFDIA detection has become one of the focuses of…
This letter proposes a novel, fully distributed, transient-safe resilient secondary control strategies for AC microgrids, addressing unbounded false data injection (FDI) attacks on control input channels. Unlike existing methods that focus…
The reliable operation of power grid is supported by energy management systems (EMS) that provide monitoring and control functionalities. Contingency analysis is a critical application of EMS to evaluate the impacts of outages and prepare…