Related papers: U Can Touch This! Microarchitectural Timing Attack…

Detection and quantification of information leaks through timing side channels are important to guarantee confidentiality. Although static analysis remains the prevalent approach for detecting timing side channels, it is computationally…

Timing channels enable data leakage that threatens the security of computer systems, from cloud platforms to smartphones and browsers executing untrusted third-party code. Preventing unauthorised information flow is a core duty of the…

This paper shows how an attacker can break the confidentiality of a hardware enclave with Membuster, an off-chip attack based on snooping the memory bus. An attacker with physical access can observe an unencrypted address bus and extract…

Machine learning (ML) models are known to be vulnerable to a number of attacks that target the integrity of their predictions or the privacy of their training data. To carry out these attacks, a black-box adversary must typically possess…

Line map, an invertible, two-dimensional chaotic encryption algorithm was introduced recently. In this paper, we propose several weaknesses of the method based on standard cryptanalytic attacks. We perform a side-channel attack by observing…

Microarchitectural attacks on CPU structures have been studied in native applications, as well as in web browsers. These attacks continue to be a substantial threat to computing systems at all scales. With the proliferation of heterogeneous…

I detail applications of timer interrupts in a popular micro-controller family to time critical applications in laser-cooling type experiments. I demonstrate a low overhead 1-bit frequency locking scheme and a multichannel experimental…

Threat hunting is a proactive methodology for exploring, detecting and mitigating cyberattacks within complex environments. As opposed to conventional detection systems, threat hunting strategies assume adversaries have infiltrated the…

The implementations of most hardened cryptographic libraries use defensive programming techniques for side-channel resistance. These techniques are usually specified as guidelines to developers on specific code patterns to use or avoid.…

Quantum key distribution protocols are known to be vulnerable against a side channel attack that exploits the time difference in detector responses used to obtain key bits. The recommended solution against this timing side channel attack is…

Screaming-channel attacks enable Electromagnetic (EM) Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) at larger distances due to higher EM leakage energies than traditional SCAs, relaxing the requirement of close access to the victim. This attack can be…

Microarchitectural attacks are a significant concern, leading to many hardware-based defense proposals. However, different defenses target different classes of attacks, and their impact on each other has not been fully considered. To raise…

We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe…

Hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of academia, industry and government agencies. Effective detection mechanisms and countermeasures against such malicious designs can only be developed when there is a deep understanding of how…

Real-time cyber-physical systems depend on deterministic task execution to guarantee safety and correctness. Unfortunately, this determinism can unintentionally expose timing information that enables adversaries to infer task execution…

We note that constituent fields (notably the fraction-of-seconds timestamp field) in the data payload structure of the synchrophasor communication protocol (IEEE C37.118 standard) are overprovisioned relative to real-world usage and needs,…

Cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructures, such as water treatment facilities, represent significant threats to public health, safety, and the environment. This paper introduces a systematic approach for modeling and assessing covert…

Timing channels are a significant and growing security threat in computer systems, with no established solution. We have recently argued that the OS must provide time protection, in analogy to the established memory protection, to protect…

As memory scales down to smaller technology nodes, new failure mechanisms emerge that threaten its correct operation. If such failure mechanisms are not anticipated and corrected, they can not only degrade system reliability and…

We present a software approach to mitigate access-driven side-channel attacks that leverage last-level caches (LLCs) shared across cores to leak information between security domains (e.g., tenants in a cloud). Our approach dynamically…