Related papers: U Can Touch This! Microarchitectural Timing Attack…
Cache template attacks demonstrated automated leakage of user input in shared libraries. However, for large binaries, the runtime is prohibitively high. Other automated approaches focused on cryptographic implementations and media software…
The threats of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures have been widely researched. Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the unavoidable influence of computation or storage on current consumption or voltage drop on a…
Side-channel attacks, which are capable of breaking secrecy via side-channel information, pose a growing threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Masking is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks by…
Analog compute-in-memory (CIM) systems are promising for deep neural network (DNN) inference acceleration due to their energy efficiency and high throughput. However, as the use of DNNs expands, protecting user input privacy has become…
Side-channel attacks exploit unintended information leakage from system behavior and continue to pose serious privacy risks in modern platforms. Despite extensive prior work, side-channel analysis remains largely manual and fragmented,…
Modern processors dynamically control their operating frequency to optimize resource utilization, maximize energy savings, and conform to system-defined constraints. If, during the execution of a software workload, the running average of…
Timing-based side and covert channels in processor caches continue to be a threat to modern computers. This work shows for the first time a systematic, large-scale analysis of Arm devices and the detailed results of attacks the processors…
Timing side-channel attacks exploit secret-dependent execution time to fully or partially recover secrets of cryptographic implementations, posing a severe threat to software security. Constant-time programming discipline is an effective…
To improve efficiency, nearly all parallel processing units (CPUs and GPUs) implement relaxed memory models in which memory operations may be re-ordered, i.e., executed out-of-order. Prior testing work in this area found that memory…
Research on cache attacks has shown that CPU caches leak significant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all cache attacks cause more cache hits and cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance…
How will future microarchitectures impact the security of existing cryptographic implementations? As we cannot keep reducing the size of transistors, chip vendors have started developing new microarchitectural optimizations to speed up…
In recent years a new class of side-channel attacks has emerged. Instead of targeting device emissions during dynamic computation, adversaries now frequently exploit the leakage or response behaviour of integrated circuits in a static…
RowHammer is a vulnerability inside DRAM chips where an attacker repeatedly accesses a DRAM row to flip bits in the nearby rows without directly accessing them. Several studies have found that flipping bits in the address part inside a page…
Operating Systems enforce logical isolation using abstractions such as processes, containers, and isolation technologies to protect a system from malicious or buggy code. In this paper, we show new types of side channels through the file…
Security of machine learning is increasingly becoming a major concern due to the ubiquitous deployment of deep learning in many security-sensitive domains. Many prior studies have shown external attacks such as adversarial examples that…
Power-based side-channel is a serious security threat to the System on Chip (SoC). The secret information is leaked from the power profile of the system while a cryptographic algorithm is running. The mitigation requires efforts from both…
Physical side-channel attacks can compromise the security of integrated circuits. Most physical side-channel attacks (e.g., power or electromagnetic) exploit the dynamic behavior of a chip, typically manifesting as changes in current…
Timing channels in cache hierarchies are an important enabler in many microarchitectural attacks. ScatterCache (USENIX 2019) is a protected cache architecture that randomizes the address-to-index mapping with a keyed cryptographic function,…
Model extraction attacks have been widely applied, which can normally be used to recover confidential parameters of neural networks for multiple layers. Recently, side-channel analysis of neural networks allows parameter extraction even for…
Rowhammer is a security vulnerability that allows unauthorized attackers to induce errors within DRAM cells. To prevent fault injections from escalating to successful attacks, a widely accepted mitigation is implementing fault checks on…