Related papers: Renegotiation-Proof Cheap Talk
We study a single-buyer pricing problem with unreliable side information, motivated by the increasing use of AI-assisted decision-making and LLM-based predictions. The seller observes a private sample that may be either accurate (coinciding…
In many real-world applications, a model provider provides probabilistic forecasts to downstream decision-makers who use them to make decisions under diverse payoff objectives. The provider may have access to multiple predictive models,…
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…
This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other's actions (private monitoring…
Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives.…
We study a contextual version of the repeated brokerage problem. In each interaction, two traders with private valuations for an item seek to buy or sell based on the learner's-a broker-proposed price, which is informed by some contextual…
In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…
If you recommend a product to me and I buy it, how much should you be paid by the seller? And if your sole interest is to maximize the amount paid to you by the seller for a sequence of recommendations, how should you recommend optimally if…
We study a multiagent learning problem where agents can either learn via repeated interactions, or can follow the advice of a mediator who suggests possible actions to take. We present an algorithmthat each agent can use so that, with high…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An informed advisor decides how much information to provide to an uninformed decision maker, so as to influence his short-term…
We derive a simple mathematical "theory" to show that two decision-making entities can work better together only if at least one of them is occasionally willing to stay neutral. This provides a mathematical "justification" for an age-old…
Testing the validity of claims made by self-proclaimed experts can be impossible when testing them in isolation, even with infinite observations at the disposal of the tester. However, in a multiple expert setting it is possible to design a…
Agents in mixed-motive coordination problems such as Chicken may fail to coordinate on a Pareto-efficient outcome. Safe Pareto improvements (SPIs) were originally proposed to mitigate miscoordination in cases where players lack…
We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their data analytics, and (2) the levels of sophistication form best…
Opinion dynamics has recently been modeled from a game-theoretic perspective, where opinion updates are captured by individuals' cost functions representing their motivations. Conventional formulations aggregate multiple motivations into a…
We consider a dynamic moral hazard problem between a principal and an agent, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of…
Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can…
Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…
We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…