Related papers: A shared-revenue Bertrand game
Iterated coopetitive games capture the situation when one must efficiently balance between cooperation and competition with the other agents over time in order to win the game (e.g., to become the player with highest total utility).…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
When there is a dispute between players on how to divide multiple divisible assets, how should it be resolved? In this paper we introduce a multi-asset game model that enables cooperation between multiple agents who bargain on sharing K…
The aim of this article is to propose a core game theory model of transaction costs wherein it is indicated how direct costs determine the probability of loss and subsequent transaction costs. The existence of optimum is proven, and the way…
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the…
We construct a model of an exchange economy in which agents trade assets contingent on an observable signal, the probability of which depends on public opinion. The agents in our model are replaced occasionally and each person updates…
The widespread deployment of Machine Learning systems everywhere raises challenges, such as dealing with interactions or competition between multiple learners. In that goal, we study multi-agent sequential decision-making by considering…
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are…
The Adjusted Winner (AW) method is a fundamental procedure for the fair division of indivisible resources between two agents. However, its reliance on splitting resources can lead to practical complications. To address this limitation, we…
We present our approach to the problem of how an agent, within an economic Multi-Agent System, can determine when it should behave strategically (i.e. learn and use models of other agents), and when it should act as a simple price-taker. We…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
In barter exchanges agents enter seeking to swap their items for other items on their wishlist. We consider a centralized barter exchange with a set of agents and items where each item has a positive value. The goal is to compute a…
In various economic environments, people observe other people with whom they strategically interact. We can model such information-sharing relations as an information network, and the strategic interactions as a game on the network. When…
Cooperation is fundamental for society's viability, as it enables the emergence of structure within heterogeneous groups that seek collective well-being. However, individuals are inclined to defect in order to benefit from the group's…
A Stackelberg duopoly model in which two firms compete to maximize their market share is considered. The firms offer a service/product to customers that are spread over several geographical regions (e.g., countries, provinces, or states).…
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how a joint reward should be shared among them. We focus on settings where the share that each agent receives depends on the subjective opinions of its peers concerning that agent's…
Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for bounding the optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods, in the case where the buyer's valuations for the items come i.i.d. from a uniform…
We introduce the notion of exchangeable equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix game, defined as those correlated equilibria in which players' strategy choices are conditionally independently and identically distributed given some hidden…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…