Related papers: Marginal Mechanisms For Balanced Exchange
Bilateral trade, a fundamental topic in economics, models the problem of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. Despite the simplicity of this…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…
We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive at most one. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial…
Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of the agents, the axiom of impartiality requires that the…
We study how an e-commerce firm should make real-time fulfillment decisions in a two-layer distribution network when multi-item customer orders arrive sequentially and future demand is unknown. The central managerial tension is whether to…
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…
We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these…
We study the problem of agent-based negotiation in combinatorial domains. It is difficult to reach optimal agreements in bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations when the agents' preferences for the possible alternatives are not common…
Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, who wish to trade a good. We study this problem from the perspective of a profit-maximizing broker within an online learning framework,…
In many realistic problems of allocating resources, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We study the…
Explore-and-exploit tradeoffs play a key role in recommendation systems (RSs), aiming at serving users better by learning from previous interactions. Despite their commercial success, the societal effects of explore-and-exploit mechanisms…
A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some.…
We develop a general framework for incorporating distributional preferences in market design. We identify the structural properties of these preferences that guarantee the path independence of choice rules. In decentralized settings, a…
We study undominated mechanisms with transfers for regulating a monopolist who privately observes the marginal cost of production. We show that in any undominated mechanism, there is a quantity floor, which depends only on the primitives,…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the \emph{balanced…
We propose a deep neural network-based solution to the problem of allocating indivisible goods under additive subjective valuations without monetary transfers, trading off economic efficiency with envy-based fairness. We introduce…
Dynamic max-min fair allocation (DMMF) is a simple and popular mechanism for the repeated allocation of a shared resource among competing agents: in each round, each agent can choose to request or not for the resource, which is then…
We study envy-free allocations of indivisible goods to agents in settings where each agent is unaware of the goods allocated to other agents. In particular, we propose the maximin aware (MMA) fairness measure, which guarantees that every…
We explore the effects of social influence in a simple market model in which a large number of agents face a binary choice: 'to buy/not to buy' a single unit of a product at a price posted by a single seller (the monopoly case). We consider…
The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of…