Related papers: Marginal Mechanisms For Balanced Exchange

Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting,…

We study a decision-maker's problem of finding optimal monetary incentive schemes for retention when faced with agents whose participation decisions (stochastically) depend on the incentive they receive. Our focus is on policies constrained…

One cannot make truly fair decisions using integer linear programs unless one controls the selection probabilities of the (possibly many) optimal solutions. For this purpose, we propose a unified framework when binary decision variables…

A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…

Myerson's seminal characterization of the revenue-optimal auction for a single item \cite{myerson1981optimal} remains a cornerstone of mechanism design. However, generalizing this framework to multi-item settings has proven exceptionally…

We characterize the extreme points of the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms for screening problems with linear utility. Our framework subsumes problems with and without transfers, such as monopoly pricing, principal-optimal bilateral…

Consider a university assigning students to courses and dorms. While many mechanisms are available, they each have their own drawbacks. Running serial dictatorship once for all goods is highly unfair, but running serial dictatorship…

When an Agent visits a platform recommending a menu of content to select from, their choice of item depends not only on fixed preferences, but also on their prior engagements with the platform. The Recommender's primary objective is…

We consider the fair division of indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive non-negative normalized valuations, with the goal of obtaining high value guarantees, that is, close to the proportional share for each agent. We prove that…

One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Two widely-studied randomized mechanisms in multiagent settings are the…

We formalize an allocation model under ordinal preferences that is more general than the well-studied Shapley-Scarf housing market. In our model, the agents do not just care which house or resource they get but also care about who gets…

We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of incentive compatibility (strategy-proofness), Pareto…

We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random priority (MRP) as extensions of the well known PS and RP mechanisms to the multi-type resource allocation problem (MTRA) with partial preferences. In our setting, there…

Constrained maximization of submodular functions poses a central problem in combinatorial optimization. In many realistic scenarios, a number of agents need to maximize multiple submodular objectives over the same ground set. We study such…

This paper introduces marginal fairness, a new individual fairness notion for equitable decision-making in the presence of protected attributes such as gender, race, and religion. This criterion ensures that decisions based on generalized…

This paper characterises optimal incentive schemes for ESG disclosure in a continuous-time principal-agent setting. We model a risk-averse principal (e.g., a platform or standard-setter) contracting with a team of heterogeneous agents whose…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with {\em bivalued submodular valuations} -- each good provides a marginal gain of either $a$ or $b$ ($a < b$) and goods have decreasing marginal gains. This…

Consider the object allocation (one-sided matching) model of Shapley and Scarf (1974). When final allocations are observed but agents' preferences are unknown, when might the allocation be in the core? This is a one-sided analogue of the…

We consider trading indivisible and easily transferable \emph{durable goods}, which are goods that an agent can receive, use, and trade again for a different good. This is often the case with books that can be read and later exchanged for…

We study a dynamic asset pricing problem in which a representative agent is ambiguous about the aggregate endowment growth rate and trades a risky stock, human capital, and a risk-free asset to maximize her preference value of consumption…