Related papers: Byzantine Stable Matching
We study the task of Byzantine gathering in a network modeled as a graph. Despite the presence of Byzantine agents, all the other (good) agents, starting from possibly different nodes and applying the same deterministic algorithm, have to…
A matching queue is described via a graph $G$ together with a matching policy. Specifically, to each node in the graph there is a corresponding arrival process of items which can either be queued, or matched with queued items in neighboring…
The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties,…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
A stable joint plan should guarantee the achievement of a designer's goal in a multi-agent environment, while ensuring that deviations from the prescribed plan would be detected. We present a computational framework where stable joint plans…
We give fault-tolerant algorithms for establishing synchrony in distributed systems in which each of the $n$ nodes has its own clock. Our algorithms operate in a very strong fault model: we require self-stabilisation, i.e., the initial…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes…
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…
We show that the ratio of matched individuals to blocking pairs grows linearly with the number of propose--accept rounds executed by the Gale--Shapley algorithm for the stable marriage problem. Consequently, the participants can arrive at…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
We investigate the hardness of establishing as many stable marriages (that is, marriages that last forever) in a population whose memory is placed in some arbitrary state with respect to the considered problem, and where traitors try to…
We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching in which players may encounter unanticipated experiences. As they become aware of these experiences, they may change their preferences over players on the other side of the market.…
A self-stabilizing protocol tolerates by definition transient faults (faults of finite duration). Recently, a new class of self-stabilizing protocols that are able to tolerate a given number of permanent faults. In this paper, we focus on…
Numerous distributed applications, such as cloud computing and distributed ledgers, necessitate the system to invoke asynchronous consensus objects an unbounded number of times, where the completion of one consensus instance is followed by…
We study the notion of robustness in stable matching problems. We first define robustness by introducing (a,b)-supermatches. An $(a,b)$-supermatch is a stable matching in which if $a$ pairs break up it is possible to find another stable…
Byzantine agreement is a fundamental problem in fault-tolerant distributed computing that has been studied intensively for the last four decades. Much of the research has focused on a static Byzantine adversary, where the adversary is…
We study a dynamic model of the relationship between two people where the states depend on the "power" in the relationship. We perform a comprehensive analysis of stability of the system, and determine a set of conditions under which stable…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable…