Related papers: Byzantine Stable Matching
We consider the following problem: two nodes want to reliably communicate in a dynamic multihop network where some nodes have been compromised, and may have a totally arbitrary and unpredictable behavior. These nodes are called Byzantine.…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
In the Stable Roommates Problem (SR), a set of $2n$ agents rank one another in a linear order. The goal is to find a matching that is stable: one that has no pair of agents who mutually prefer each other over their assigned partners. We…
Large language models are increasingly deployed as cooperating agents, yet their behavior in adversarial consensus settings has not been systematically studied. We evaluate LLM-based agents on a Byzantine consensus game over scalar values…
The classical stable marriage problem asks for a matching between a set of men and a set of women with no blocking pairs, which are pairs formed by a man and a woman who would both prefer switching from their current status to be paired up…
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have preferences over sets of potential roommates. We study the complexity of finding good allocations of agents to rooms under the assumption that…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
In extending fast digital clock synchronization to the bounded-delay model, the expected constant time Byzantine pulse resynchronization problem is investigated. In this problem, the synchronized state of the system should not only be…
A reliable communication primitive guarantees the delivery, integrity, and authorship of messages exchanged between correct processes of a distributed system. We investigate the necessary and sufficient conditions for reliable communication…
In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
This paper studies the Byzantine Agreement problem where the nodes have access to a predictor that flags nodes for suspicion of faulty (Byzantine) behavior. We focus on algorithmic resilience -- the maximum number of faulty nodes an…
The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their…
We adopt the notion of the farsighted stable set to determine which matchings are stable when agents are farsighted in matching markets with couples. We show that a singleton matching is a farsighted stable set if and only if the matching…
This short paper presents a necessary condition for Byzantine $k$-set agreement in (synchronous or asynchronous) message-passing systems and asynchronous shared memory systems where the processes communicate through atomic single-writer…
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…