Related papers: SMaCk: Efficient Instruction Cache Attacks via Sel…

This paper evaluates new security threats due to the processor frontend in modern Intel processors. The root causes of the security threats are the multiple paths in the processor frontend that the micro-operations can take: through the…

Fault injection attacks represent a class of threats that can compromise embedded systems across multiple layers of abstraction, such as system software, instruction set architecture (ISA), microarchitecture, and physical implementation.…

Security-Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC) is a fundamental problem in power systems and electricity markets. In practical settings, SCUC is repeatedly solved via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming, sometimes multiple times per day, with…

We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe…

Side-channel attacks impose a serious threat to cryptographic algorithms, including widely employed ones, such as AES and RSA. These attacks take advantage of the algorithm implementation in hardware or software to extract secret…

Modern computer processors use microarchitectural optimization mechanisms to improve performance. As a downside, such optimizations are prone to introducing side-channel vulnerabilities. Speculative loading of memory, called prefetching, is…

Recently discovered Spectre and meltdown attacks affects almost all processors by leaking confidential information to other processes through side-channel attacks. These vulnerabilities expose design flaws in the architecture of modern…

Cache attacks exploit memory access patterns of cryptographic implementations. Constant-Time implementation techniques have become an indispensable tool in fighting cache timing attacks. These techniques engineer the memory accesses of…

Cache occupancy attacks exploit the shared nature of cache hierarchies to infer a victim's activities by monitoring overall cache usage, unlike access-driven cache attacks that focus on specific cache lines or sets. There exists some prior…

We propose a framework for the design and optimization of a secure self-optimizing, self-adapting system-on-chip (S4oC) architecture. The goal is to minimize the impact of attacks such as hardware Trojan and side-channel, by making…

Software-based fault isolation (SFI) is a technique to isolate a potentially faulty or malicious software module from the rest of a system using instruction-level rewriting. SFI implementations on CISC architectures, including Google Native…

The adversarial model presented by trusted execution environments (TEEs) has prompted researchers to investigate unusual attack vectors. One particularly powerful class of controlled-channel attacks abuses page-table modifications to…

The recent Meltdown and Spectre attacks highlight the importance of automated verification techniques for identifying hardware security vulnerabilities. We have developed a tool for synthesizing microarchitecture-specific programs capable…

The Sphynx project was an exploratory study to discover what might be done to improve the heavy replication of in- structions in independent instruction caches for a massively parallel machine where a single program is executing across all…

Caches on the modern commodity CPUs have become one of the major sources of side-channel leakages and been abused as a new attack vector. To thwart the cache-based side-channel attacks, two types of countermeasures have been proposed:…

A memory consistency model specifies the allowed behaviors of shared memory concurrent programs. At the language level, these models are known to have a non-trivial impact on the safety of program optimizations, limiting the ability to…

The recent Spectre attacks have demonstrated that modern microarchitectural optimizations can make software insecure. These attacks use features like pipelining, out-of-order and speculation to extract information about the memory contents…

Spectre intrusions exploit speculative execution design vulnerabilities in modern processors. The attacks violate the principles of isolation in programs to gain unauthorized private user information. Current state-of-the-art detection…

We demonstrate that the format in which private keys are persisted impacts Side Channel Analysis (SCA) security. Surveying several widely deployed software libraries, we investigate the formats they support, how they parse these keys, and…

Intra-session network coding is known to be vulnerable to pollution attacks. In this work, first, we introduce a novel homomorphic MAC scheme called SpaceMac, which allows an intermediate node to verify if its received packets belong to a…