Related papers: Social Choice Rules with Responsibility for Indivi…

We study incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize the Nash Social Welfare. Since traditional incentive-compatible mechanisms cannot maximize the Nash Social Welfare even approximately, we propose changing the traditional model.…

Conventional preference learning methods often prioritize opinions held more widely when aggregating preferences from multiple evaluators. This may result in policies that are biased in favor of some types of opinions or groups and…

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash…

We consider a social system of interacting heterogeneous agents with learning abilities, a model close to Random Field Ising Models, where the random field corresponds to the idiosyncratic willingness to pay. Given a fixed price, agents…

We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We show that any…

We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over…

We consider two player quadratic games in a cooperative framework known as social value orientation, motivated by the need to account for complex interactions between humans and autonomous agents in dynamical systems. Social value…

Ranking individuals based on their performance in different coalitions is a problem emerging in various domains (teams sports, scientific evaluation, argumentation, etc.). Often, for practical reasons, the number of comparable coalitions is…

What is the best compromise in a situation where different people value different things? The most commonly accepted method for answering this question -- in fields across the behavioral and social sciences, decision theory, philosophy, and…

One strategy in response to pluralistic values in a user population is to personalize an AI system: if the AI can adapt to the specific values of each individual, then we can potentially avoid many of the challenges of pluralism.…

Model explainability is crucial for human users to be able to interpret how a proposed classifier assigns labels to data based on its feature values. We study generalized linear models constructed using sets of feature value rules, which…

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly entrusted with high-stakes decisions that affect human welfare. However, the principles and values that guide these models when distributing scarce societal resources remain largely unexamined.…

This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mechanism to fully recover equilibrium social optimum via…

In economic theory, an agent chooses from available alternatives -- modeled as a set. In decisions in the field or in the lab, however, agents do not have access to the set of alternatives at once. Instead, alternatives are represented by…

This paper generalizes the original Schelling (1969, 1971a,b, 2006) model of racial and residential segregation to a context of variable externalities due to social linkages. In a setting in which individuals' utility function is a convex…

The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…

The consideration of nonstandard models of the real numbers and the definition of a qualitative ordering on those models provides a generalization of the principle of maximization of expected utility. It enables the decider to assign…

Game theory has emerged as a fruitful paradigm for the design of networked multiagent systems. A fundamental component of this approach is the design of agents' utility functions so that their self-interested maximization results in a…

Making a decision is often a matter of listing and comparing positive and negative arguments. In such cases, the evaluation scale for decisions should be considered bipolar, that is, negative and positive values should be explicitly…

Iterative voting is a natural model of repeated strategic decision-making in social choice theory when agents have the opportunity to update their votes prior to finalizing the group decision. Prior work has analyzed the efficacy of…