Related papers: The Market Design for Formulary Positions
The purpose of this paper is to apply the economics field of market design to develop a simple algebraic and graphic model of a combinatorial auction for formulary position assignments.
We study an auction setting in which bidders bid for placement of their content within a summary generated by a large language model (LLM), e.g., an ad auction in which the display is a summary paragraph of multiple ads. This generalizes…
Models of auctions or tendering processes are introduced. In every round of bidding the players select their bid from a probability distribution and whenever a bid is unsuccessful, it is discarded and replaced. For simple models, the…
Display advertising has traditionally been sold via guaranteed contracts -- a guaranteed contract is a deal between a publisher and an advertiser to allocate a certain number of impressions over a certain period, for a pre-specified price…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
The idea of this paper is an advanced game concept. This concept is expected to model non-monetary bilateral cooperations between self-interested agents. Such non-monetary cases are social cooperations like allocation of high level jobs or…
Valuation and parity formulas for both European-style and American-style exchange options are presented in a general financial model allowing for jumps, possibility of default and "bubbles" in asset prices. The formulas are given via…
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…
A prevalent assumption in auction theory is that the auctioneer has full control over the market and that the allocation she dictates is final. In practice, however, agents might be able to resell acquired items in an aftermarket. A…
The goal of this paper is to propose a framework for representing and reasoning about the rules governing a combinatorial exchange. Such a framework is at first interest as long as we want to build up digital marketplaces based on auction,…
We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design in a Bayesian framework in order to incorporate prior information into the auction process and minimize the number of rounds to convergence. We first develop a generative model of agent…
We propose a general stochastic framework for modelling repeated auctions in the Real Time Bidding (RTB) ecosystem using point processes. The flexibility of the framework allows a variety of auction scenarios including configuration of…
We focus on a permutation betting market under parimutuel call auction model where traders bet on the final ranking of n candidates. We present a Proportional Betting mechanism for this market. Our mechanism allows the traders to bet on any…
Ad exchanges are an emerging platform for trading advertisement slots on the web with billions of dollars revenue per year. Every time a user visits a web page, the publisher of that web page can ask an ad exchange to auction off the ad…
Combinatorial auctions are formulated as frustrated lattice gases on sparse random graphs, allowing the determination of the optimal revenue by methods of statistical physics. Transitions between computationally easy and hard regimes are…
This paper describes an optimization model for setting bid levels for certain types of advertisements on web pages. This model is non-convex, but we are able to obtain optimal or near-optimal solutions rapidly using branch and cut…
We establish a general optimization framework for the design of automated bidding agent in dynamic online marketplaces. It optimizes solely for the buyer's interest and is agnostic to the auction mechanism imposed by the seller. As a…
In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids…
This paper develops algorithms to solve strong-substitutes product-mix auctions. That is, it finds competitive equilibrium prices and quantities for agents who use this auction's bidding language to truthfully express their…
We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset of a given set of unobservable actions, each of which has an…