Related papers: Strong Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Bounded G…
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium for imperfect-information extensive-form games (EFGs) that enforces consistency between the two components of a solution: agents' strategy profile describing their…
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th…
Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…
A repeated network game where agents have quadratic utilities that depend on information externalities -- an unknown underlying state -- as well as payoff externalities -- the actions of all other agents in the network -- is considered.…
We introduce a new paradigm for game theory -- Bayesian satisfaction. This novel approach is a synthesis of the idea of Bayesian rationality introduced by Aumann, and satisfaction games. The concept of Bayesian rationality for which, in…
The prevailing methodology for analyzing population games and evolutionary dynamics in the large population limit assumes that a Poisson process (or clock) inherent to each agent determines when the agent can revise its strategy. Hence,…
Classical results of Decision Theory, and its extension to a multi-agent setting: Game Theory, operate only at the associative level of information; this is, classical decision makers only take into account probabilities of events; we go…
The application of game theory in cybersecurity enables strategic analysis, adversarial modeling, and optimal decision-making to address security threats' complex and dynamic nature. Previous studies by Abraham et al. and Bi\c{c}er et al.…
The increasing prevalence of multi-agent learning systems in society necessitates understanding how to learn effective and safe policies in general-sum multi-agent environments against a variety of opponents, including self-play.…
Much work in AI deals with the selection of proper actions in a given (known or unknown) environment. However, the way to select a proper action when facing other agents is quite unclear. Most work in AI adopts classical game-theoretic…
Information design (ID) explores how a sender influence the optimal behavior of receivers to achieve specific objectives. While ID originates from everyday human communication, existing game-theoretic and machine learning methods often…
This paper introduces two fundamentally new concepts to game theory: multilateral Nash equilibria and families of games. Starting with non-cooperative games, we show how these notions together seamlessly integrate into and naturally extend…
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…
To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the strategies of better performing players in the hope of successful reproduction. In structured populations the array of those that are eligible…
Strategic dialogue requires agents to execute distinct dialogue acts, for which belief estimation is essential. While prior work often estimates beliefs accurately, it lacks a principled mechanism to use those beliefs during generation. We…
We propose a game-theoretic framework for adaptive multi-agent intelligent systems. Unlike classical game theory, which often treats strategies as primitive objects chosen by perfectly rational agents, the proposed framework provides a…
An important challenge in non-cooperative game theory is coordinating on a single (approximate) equilibrium from many possibilities - a challenge that becomes even more complex when players hold private information. Recommender mechanisms…
In this paper we consider a network of boolean agents that compete for a limited resource. The agents play the so called Generalized Minority Game where the capacity level is allowed to vary externally. We study the properties of such a…
Big Boss Games represent a specific class of cooperative games where a single veto player, known as the Big Boss, plays a central role in determining resource allocation and maintaining coalition stability. In this paper, we introduce a…
We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that locally…