Related papers: Exact Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attacks using T…
We demonstrate that the format in which private keys are persisted impacts Side Channel Analysis (SCA) security. Surveying several widely deployed software libraries, we investigate the formats they support, how they parse these keys, and…
Attacks based on side-channel analysis (SCA) pose a severe security threat to modern computing platforms, further exacerbated on IoT devices by their pervasiveness and handling of private and critical data. Designing SCA-resistant computing…
Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research…
This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed as exploitable leakage.…
During the last decade, Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have progressively been integrated on all types of platforms, from data centers to embedded systems including low-power processors and, recently, FPGAs. Neural Networks (NN) are expected to…
Intel SGX is known to be vulnerable to a class of practical attacks exploiting memory access pattern side-channels, notably page-fault attacks and cache timing attacks. A promising hardening scheme is to wrap applications in hardware…
Side-channel attacks have empowered bypassing of cryptographic components in circuits. Power side-channel (PSC) attacks have received particular traction, owing to their non-invasiveness and proven effectiveness. Aside from prior art…
Side-channel attacks on memory (SCAM) exploit unintended data leaks from memory subsystems to infer sensitive information, posing significant threats to system security. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities in memory access patterns, cache…
The arm race between hardware security engineers and side-channel researchers has become more competitive with more sophisticated attacks and defenses in the last decade. While modern hardware features improve the system performance…
Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis (SCA) is a prominent tool to break mathematically-secure cryptographic engines, especially on resource-constrained IoT devices. Presently, to perform EM SCA on an embedded IoT device, the entire…
Evaluating side-channel analysis (SCA) security is a complex process, involving applying several techniques whose success depends on human engineering. Therefore, it is crucial to avoid a false sense of confidence provided by non-optimal…
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) relaxes the black-box assumption of conventional cryptanalysis by incorporating physical measurements acquired during cryptographic operations. Electro-magnetic (EM) emissions of a chip during computations often…
Information leakage is a significant problem in modern software systems. Information leaks due to side channels are especially hard to detect and analyze. In this paper, we present techniques for automated synthesis of adaptive side-channel…
Last-level cache side-channel attacks have been mostly demonstrated in highly-controlled, quiescent local environments. Hence, it is unclear whether such attacks are feasible in a production cloud environment. In the cloud, side channels…
We present a new hardware-agnostic side-channel attack that targets one of the most fundamental software caches in modern computer systems: the operating system page cache. The page cache is a pure software cache that contains all…
Timing side-channel attacks exploit variations in program execution time to recover sensitive information. Cryptographic implementations are especially vulnerable to these attacks, since even small timing differences in operations such as…
Side-channel attacks (SCAs) pose a serious threat to system security by extracting secret keys through physical leakages such as power consumption, timing variations, and electromagnetic emissions. Among existing countermeasures, artificial…
We propose SANSCrypt, a novel sequential logic encryption scheme to protect integrated circuits against reverse engineering. Previous sequential encryption methods focus on modifying the circuit state machine such that the correct…
Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are widely used in embedded microcontrollers, particularly in cryptographic applications, to extract sensitive information. However, expanding the applications of PSC attacks to broader security contexts in…
Physical side channels emerge from the relation between internal computation or data with observable physical parameters of a chip. Previous works mostly focus on properties related to current consumption such as power consumption. The…