Related papers: Full Proportional Justified Representation
We propose a novel algorithm for learning fair representations that can simultaneously mitigate two notions of disparity among different demographic subgroups in the classification setting. Two key components underpinning the design of our…
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process…
For a rational matrix function R of one variable in general position, the matrix functions R(x)/R(y) and R(y)\R(x) of two variables are considered. For these matrix functions of two variables, representations which are analogous to the…
Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…
We define several different thresholds for election methods by considering different scenarios, corresponding to different proportionality criteria that have been proposed by various authors. In particular, we reformulate the criteria known…
A population of voters must elect representatives among themselves to decide on a sequence of possibly unforeseen binary issues. Voters care only about the final decision, not the elected representatives. The disutility of a voter is…
In an election where $n$ voters rank $m$ candidates, a Condorcet winning set is a committee of $k$ candidates such that for any outside candidate, a majority of voters prefer some committee member. Condorcet's paradox shows that some…
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
Representativeness is a foundational yet slippery concept. Though familiar at first blush, it lacks a single precise meaning. Instead, meanings range from typical or characteristic, to a proportionate match between sample and population, to…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
In an approval-based committee election, the task is to select a committee of up to $k$ candidates from a set of $m$ candidates based on the preferences of $n$ voters, each of whom approves a subset of the candidates. A central open…
In recent years, there has been a surge in effort to formalize notions of fairness in machine learning. We focus on centroid clustering--one of the fundamental tasks in unsupervised machine learning. We propose a new axiom ``proportionally…
In the late 19th century, Swedish mathematician Lars Edvard Phragm\'{e}n proposed a load-balancing approach for selecting committees based on approval ballots. We consider three committee voting rules resulting from this approach: two…
Rankings of people and items has been highly used in selection-making, match-making, and recommendation algorithms that have been deployed on ranging of platforms from employment websites to searching tools. The ranking position of a…
A natural notion of rationality/consistency for aggregating models is that, for all (possibly aggregated) models $A$ and $B$, if the output of model $A$ is $f(A)$ and if the output model $B$ is $f(B)$, then the output of the model obtained…
We consider the participatory budgeting problem where each of $n$ voters specifies additive utilities over $m$ candidate projects with given sizes, and the goal is to choose a subset of projects (i.e., a committee) with total size at most…
Every representative democracy must specify a mechanism under which voters choose their representatives. The most common mechanism in the United States -- Winner takes all single-member districts -- both enables substantial partisan…
A challenge in fair algorithm design is that, while there are compelling notions of individual fairness, these notions typically do not satisfy desirable composition properties, and downstream applications based on fair classifiers might…
Multi-winner approval voting selects a size-$k$ committee that aggregates voters' approval preferences over a set of alternatives. A central question is coalitional stability: No coalition should be able to pick a committee -- of size at…