Related papers: Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic …
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum Stackelberg stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) differential game over finite horizons. Under a fairly weak condition, the Stackelberg equilibrium is explicitly obtained by first solving a…
In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…
In this paper, a Nash-type fictitious game framework is introduced to handle a time-inconsistent linear-quadratic optimal control. The Nash-type game in this framework is called fictitious as it is between the decision maker (called real…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction…
An open problem in linear quadratic (LQ) games has been characterizing the Nash equilibria. This problem has renewed relevance given the surge of work on understanding the convergence of learning algorithms in dynamic games. This paper…
We study the convergence time of the best response dynamics in player-specific singleton congestion games. It is well known that this dynamics can cycle, although from every state a short sequence of best responses to a Nash equilibrium…
We formulate and study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic dynamic games with partial and asymmetric information. Information asymmetry introduces fundamental challenges involving \emph{belief representation} and \emph{theory of mind}…
The paper studies the convergence properties of (continuous) best-response dynamics from game theory. Despite their fundamental role in game theory, best-response dynamics are poorly understood in many games of interest due to the…
There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While…
Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are defined to predict the outcome of such situations.…
Feedback Nash equilibrium strategies in multi-agent dynamic games require availability of all players' state information to compute control actions. However, in real-world scenarios, sensing and communication limitations between agents make…
In this paper, the open-loop and closed-loop local and remote stochastic nonzero-sum game (LRSNG) problem is investigated. Different from previous works, the stochastic nonzero-sum game problem under consideration is essentially a special…
In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…
Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…
We propose projection-free sequential algorithms for linear-quadratic dynamics games. These policy gradient based algorithms are akin to Stackelberg leadership model and can be extended to model-free settings. We show that if the leader…
We study infinite-horizon discounted two-player zero-sum Markov games, and develop a decentralized algorithm that provably converges to the set of Nash equilibria under self-play. Our algorithm is based on running an Optimistic Gradient…
In this letter, we study a model-based inverse problem for infinite-horizon linear-quadratic differential games with descriptor dynamics. Given an observed feedback strategy profile, we seek to identify all cost functions that rationalize…
This paper studies the limits of empirical means of open-loop Nash equilibria of linear-quadratic stochastic differential games as the number of players goes to infinity, when the corresponding mean field game is of potential type and may…
In this paper, we study a class of two-player deterministic finite-horizon difference games with coupled inequality constraints, where each player has two types of decision variables: one involving sequential interactions and the other…