Related papers: Best Response Convergence for Zero-sum Stochastic …

Best-response (BR) schemes represent an important avenue for learning equilibria in noncooperative games. However, extant rate guarantees for BR schemes generally necessitate stringent smoothness requirements on player objectives and the…

This paper is concerned with a two-person zero-sum indefinite stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric informational uncertainties, where both the leader and follower face different and unknown disturbances.…

Zero-sum Linear Quadratic (LQ) games are fundamental in optimal control and can be used (i)~as a dynamic game formulation for risk-sensitive or robust control and (ii)~as a benchmark setting for multi-agent reinforcement learning with two…

Safety is critical during human-robot interaction. But -- because people are inherently unpredictable -- it is often difficult for robots to plan safe behaviors. Instead of relying on our ability to anticipate humans, here we identify robot…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…

The notion of fault tolerant Nash equilibria has been introduced as a way of studying the robustness of Nash equilibria. Under this notion, a fixed number of players are allowed to exhibit faulty behavior in which they may deviate…

In this work, we introduce a new variant of online gradient descent, which provably converges to Nash Equilibria and simultaneously attains sublinear regret for the class of congestion games in the semi-bandit feedback setting. Our proposed…

In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…

In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…

In this paper, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a multi-player game is considered. The players are only aware of their own cost functions as well as the action space of all players. We develop a relatively fast algorithm within…

In this paper, an aggregate game approach is proposed for the modeling and analysis of energy consumption control in smart grid. Since the electricity user's cost function depends on the aggregate load, which is unknown to the end users, an…

Repeated games consider a situation where multiple agents are motivated by their independent rewards throughout learning. In general, the dynamics of their learning become complex. Especially when their rewards compete with each other like…

We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a…

Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around their optimum, i.e., Nash equilibrium. When a game…

Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we…

We develop provably efficient reinforcement learning algorithms for two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. To incorporate function approximation, we consider a family of Markov games where the reward…

A Linear Quadratic Deterministic Continuous Time Game with many symmetric players is considered and the Linear Feedback Nash strategies are studied as the number of players goes to infinity. We show that under some conditions the limit of…

This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic non-zero sum differential game with asymmetric delayed information. To be specific, two players exist time delays simultaneously which are different, leading the dynamical system being an…

We consider strongly monotone games with convex separable coupling constraints, played by dynamical agents, in a partial-decision information scenario. We start by designing continuous-time fully distributed feedback controllers, based on…

In this paper, we investigate the seeking of Nash equilibrium (NE) in a non-cooperative quadratic game where all agents exchange their delayed strategy information with their neighbors. To extend best-response algorithms to the delayed…