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Extensive-form games provide a versatile framework for modeling interactions of multiple agents subjected to imperfect observations and stochastic events. In recent years, two paradigms, policy space response oracles (PSRO) and…
Computing equilibria of games is a central task in computer science. A large number of results are known for \emph{Nash equilibrium} (NE). However, these can be adopted only when coalitions are not an issue. When instead agents can form…
Hindsight rationality is an approach to playing general-sum games that prescribes no-regret learning dynamics for individual agents with respect to a set of deviations, and further describes jointly rational behavior among multiple agents…
Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general {\sf PLS}-complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes…
We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…
Simple stochastic games are two-player zero-sum stochastic games with turn-based moves, perfect information, and reachability winning conditions. We present two new algorithms computing the values of simple stochastic games. Both of them…
We consider a class of hierarchical noncooperative $N$-player games where the $i$th player solves a parametrized stochastic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) with the caveat that the implicit form of the $i$th…
Quantum game theory lays a foundation for understanding the interaction of people using quantum computers with conflicting interests. Recently Zhang proposed a simple yet rich model to study quantum strategic games, and addressed some…
We examine the problem of efficiently learning coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in polyhedral games, that is, normal-form games with an exponentially large number of actions per player and an underlying combinatorial structure. Prominent…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an important solution concept in game theory which has been applied frequently to biological models. Informally an ESS is a strategy that if followed by the population cannot be taken over by a…
The sequential equilibrium is a standard solution concept for extensive-form games with imperfect information that includes an explicit representation of the players' beliefs. An assessment consisting of a strategy and a belief is a…
In this paper, we introduce the first algorithmic framework for Blackwell approachability on the sequence-form polytope, the class of convex polytopes capturing the strategies of players in extensive-form games (EFGs). This leads to a new…
We study the problem of characterizing the set of games that are consistent with observed equilibrium play. Our contribution is to develop and analyze a new methodology based on convex optimization to address this problem for many classes…
The proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson (1978), is a classic refinement of the Nash equilibrium that has been referred to as the "mother of all refinements." For normal-form games, computing a proper equilibrium is known to be…
Solving feedback Stackelberg games with nonlinear dynamics and coupled constraints, a common scenario in practice, presents significant challenges. This work introduces an efficient method for computing approximate local feedback…
The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…
Motivated by applications to data networks where fast convergence is essential, we analyze the problem of learning in generic N-person games that admit a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Specifically, we consider a scenario where…
The increasing prevalence of multi-agent learning systems in society necessitates understanding how to learn effective and safe policies in general-sum multi-agent environments against a variety of opponents, including self-play.…
The analysis of network routing games typically assumes, right at the onset, precise and detailed information about the latency functions. Such information may, however, be unavailable or difficult to obtain. Moreover, one is often…
We present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria in a broad class of constraint satisfaction games that generalize the well-known cut and party affiliation games. Our results improve previous ones by Bhalgat et al.~(EC…