Related papers: Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria unde…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…

We study testable implications of multiple equilibria in discrete games with incomplete information. Unlike de Paula and Tang (2012), we allow the players' private signals to be correlated. In static games, we leverage independence of…

The paper analyzes the interactions among one public firm and $n$ private firms on the market, in the framework of a discrete-time Cournot game with time delay. The production of the public firm is influenced by previous output levels of…

Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting to study conditions under which a coordination…

Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…

Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability…

Learning processes in games explain how players grapple with one another in seeking an equilibrium. We study a natural model of learning based on individual gradients in two-player continuous games. In such games, the arguably natural…

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…

We study optimal behavior of energy producers under a CO_2 emission abatement program. We focus on a two-player discrete-time model where each producer is sequentially optimizing her emission and production schedules. The game-theoretic…

In this paper I present several algorithmic techniques for improving the decision process of multiple types of agents behaving in environments where their interests are in conflict. The interactions between the agents are modelled by using…

We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

We study a generic family of two-player continuous-time nonzero-sum stopping games modeling a war of attrition with symmetric information and stochastic payoffs that depend on an homogeneous linear diffusion. We first show that any…

Static stability in economic models means negative incentives for deviation from equilibrium strategies, which we expect to assure a return to equilibrium, i.e., dynamic stability, as long as agents respond to incentives. There have been…

This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…

We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…

We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their…

In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash…

We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match offers that get finalized when a…

We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…