Related papers: Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria unde…
We study linear quadratic dynamic games where players are uncertain about each other's control policies or goals and consequently seek to be strategically robust. Building on recent work on strategically robust and risk-averse game theory,…
Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the…
Many real-world multi-agent interactions consider multiple distinct criteria, i.e. the payoffs are multi-objective in nature. However, the same multi-objective payoff vector may lead to different utilities for each participant. Therefore,…
We analyze the influence of multiplayer interactions and network adaptation on the stability of equilibrium points in evolutionary games. We consider the Snowdrift game with both two-player and three-player interactions on simplicial…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of…
Distributed decision making in multi-agent networks has recently attracted significant research attention thanks to its wide applicability, e.g. in the management and optimization of computer networks, power systems, robotic teams, sensor…
We consider an economy made of competing firms which are heterogeneous in their capital and use several inputs for producing goods. Their consumption policy is fixed rationally by maximizing a utility and their capital cannot fall below a…
We study a general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information where agents' beliefs are strategy dependent, i.e. signaling occurs. We show that the notion of sufficient information, introduced in the companion paper team, can be…
The study of games and their equilibria is central to developing insights for understanding many socio-economic phenomena. Here we present a dynamical systems view of the equilibria of two-person, payoff-symmetric games. In particular,…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
We consider stochastic differential games with a large number of players, with the aim of quantifying the gap between closed-loop, open-loop and distributed equilibria. We show that, under two different semi-monotonicity conditions, the…
In this paper we study a class of matrix-valued linear-quadratic mean-field-type games for both the risk-neutral, risk-sensitive and robust cases. Non-cooperation, full cooperation and adversarial between teams are treated. We provide a…
In the real world, people/entities usually find matches independently and autonomously, such as finding jobs, partners, roommates, etc. It is possible that this search for matches starts with no initial knowledge of the environment. We…
This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of worker-quasi-core, firm-quasi-core, and worker-quasisetwise…
When interpersonal interactions between individuals are described by the (discrete or continuous) dynamical systems, the interactions are usually assumed to be instantaneous: the rates of change of the actual states of the actors at given…
Collaboration is an integral part of human dialogue. Typical task-oriented dialogue games assign asymmetric roles to the participants, which limits their ability to elicit naturalistic role-taking in collaboration and its negotiation. We…
High performance machine learning models have become highly dependent on the availability of large quantity and quality of training data. To achieve this, various central agencies such as the government have suggested for different data…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called "roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We…
We consider the problem of dynamic information design with one sender and one receiver where the sender observers a private state of the system and takes an action to send a signal based on its observation to a receiver. Based on this…