Related papers: Leakage-Robust Bayesian Persuasion
We consider a 1-to-$K$ communication scenario, where a source transmits private messages to $K$ receivers through a broadcast erasure channel, and the receivers feed back strictly causally and publicly their channel states after each…
We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted posterior in our model can be written as a convex…
In many real-world scenarios, experts must convey complex information with limited message capacity. This paper explores how the availability of messages influences an expert's persuasive ability. We develop a geometric representation of…
I study a model of costly Bayesian persuasion by a privately and partially informed sender who conducts a public experiment. The cost of running an experiment is the expected reduction of a weighted log-likelihood ratio function of the…
We establish a simple connection between robust and differentially-private algorithms: private mechanisms which perform well with very high probability are automatically robust in the sense that they retain accuracy even if a constant…
In many decision-making scenarios, individuals strategically choose what information to disclose to optimize their own outcomes. It is unclear whether such strategic information disclosure can lead to good societal outcomes. To address this…
For the modeling, design and planning of future energy transmission networks, it is vital for stakeholders to access faithful and useful power flow data, while provably maintaining the privacy of business confidentiality of service…
Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents' decisions via strategic information revelation --- often described as a signaling scheme --- in order to yield the most desirable equilibrium outcome. Recently, there has been a large…
We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and a corresponding positive or negative payoff, or to refrain.…
The problem of publishing privacy-guaranteed data for hypothesis testing is studied using the maximal leakage (ML) as a metric for privacy and the type-II error exponent as the utility metric. The optimal mechanism (random mapping) that…
This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately possesses…
Differential privacy is a notion of privacy that has become very popular in the database community. Roughly, the idea is that a randomized query mechanism provides sufficient privacy protection if the ratio between the probabilities that…
The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an interaction between two agents: sender and receiver. The…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the…
Side channels represent a broad class of security vulnerabilities that have been demonstrated to exist in many applications. Because completely eliminating side channels often leads to prohibitively high overhead, there is a need for a…
We study Bayesian persuasion under approximate best response, where the receiver may choose any action that is not too much suboptimal given their posterior belief upon receiving the signal. We focus on the computational aspects of the…
In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…
We study a hypothesis testing problem with a privacy constraint over a noisy channel and derive the performance of optimal tests under the Neyman-Pearson criterion. The fundamental limit of interest is the privacy-utility tradeoff (PUT)…
When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the…