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Auto-bidding has recently become a popular feature in ad auctions. This feature enables advertisers to simply provide high-level constraints and goals to an automated agent, which optimizes their auction bids on their behalf. In this paper,…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2024-05-15 Yeganeh Alimohammadi , Aranyak Mehta , Andres Perlroth

The rise of auto-bidding has created challenges for ensuring advertiser incentive compatibility, particularly when advertisers delegate bidding to agents with high-level constraints. One challenge in defining incentive compatibility is the…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-08-26 Christopher Liaw , Wennan Zhu

Most of the work in the auction design literature assumes that bidders behave rationally based on the information available for every individual auction, and the revelation principle enables designers to restrict their efforts to incentive…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-05-14 Juncheng Li , Pingzhong Tang

Auto-bidding plays an important role in online advertising and has become a crucial tool for advertisers and advertising platforms to meet their performance objectives and optimize the efficiency of ad delivery. Advertisers employing…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2020-12-07 Bin Li , Xiao Yang , Daren Sun , Zhi Ji , Zhen Jiang , Cong Han , Dong Hao

Real-time bidding (RTB) has become a major paradigm of display advertising. Each ad impression generated from a user visit is auctioned in real time, where demand-side platform (DSP) automatically provides bid price usually relying on the…

Information Retrieval · Computer Science 2022-12-26 Zhimeng Jiang , Kaixiong Zhou , Mi Zhang , Rui Chen , Xia Hu , Soo-Hyun Choi

In this paper we investigate the problem of measuring end-to-end Incentive Compatibility (IC) regret given black-box access to an auction mechanism. Our goal is to 1) compute an estimate for IC regret in an auction, 2) provide a measure of…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2019-06-05 Zhe Feng , Okke Schrijvers , Eric Sodomka

This paper presents a novel non-stationary dynamic pricing algorithm design, where pricing agents face incomplete demand information and market environment shifts. The agents run price experiments to learn about each product's demand curve…

Machine Learning · Statistics 2022-09-09 Po-Yi Liu , Chi-Hua Wang , Henghsiu Tsai

We consider a variant of the standard Bayesian mechanism, where players evaluate their outcomes and constraints in an ex-ante manner. Such a model captures a major form of modern online advertising where an advertiser is concerned with…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2022-03-01 Bonan Ni , Pingzhong Tang

We present novel online mechanisms for traffic intersection auctions in which users bid for priority service. We assume that users at the front of their lane are requested to declare their delay cost, i.e. value of time, and that users are…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2020-10-15 David Rey , Michael W Levin , Vinayak V Dixit

We study the problem of auction design for advertising platforms that face strategic advertisers who are bidding across platforms. Each advertiser's goal is to maximize their total value or conversions while satisfying some constraint(s)…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-05-07 Gagan Aggarwal , Andres Perlroth , Ariel Schvartzman , Mingfei Zhao

Auto-bidding plays a crucial role in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained popularity for auto-bidding. However, most current RL auto-bidding methods are…

Machine Learning · Computer Science 2024-10-10 Jiayan Guo , Yusen Huo , Zhilin Zhang , Tianyu Wang , Chuan Yu , Jian Xu , Yan Zhang , Bo Zheng

Automated bidding to optimize online advertising with various constraints, e.g. ROI constraints and budget constraints, is widely adopted by advertisers. A key challenge lies in designing algorithms for non-truthful mechanisms with ROI…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-10-21 Yuan Deng , Yilin Li , Wei Tang , Hanrui Zhang

A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or a lack of information, and may not be able to perfectly…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2022-03-28 Santiago Balseiro , Omar Besbes , Francisco Castro

Online advertising platforms use automated auctions to connect advertisers with potential customers, requiring effective bidding strategies to maximize profits. Accurate ad impact estimation requires considering three key factors: delayed…

Machine Learning · Computer Science 2025-10-24 Yuwei Cheng , Zifeng Zhao , Haifeng Xu

Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via social relations, whereby both the seller's revenue and the…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2020-04-28 Bin Li , Dong Hao , Dengji Zhao

This paper studies an electricity market consisting of an independent system operator (ISO) and a group of generators. The goal is to solve the DC optimal power flow (DC-OPF) problem: have the generators collectively meet the power demand…

Optimization and Control · Mathematics 2017-02-22 Ashish Cherukuri , Jorge Cortes

Since 2019, most ad exchanges and sell-side platforms (SSPs), in the online advertising industry, shifted from second to first price auctions. Due to the fundamental difference between these auctions, demand-side platforms (DSPs) have had…

Incrementality, which is used to measure the causal effect of showing an ad to a potential customer (e.g. a user in an internet platform) versus not, is a central object for advertisers in online advertising platforms. This paper…

Machine Learning · Computer Science 2023-01-18 Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru , Zhe Feng , Tianxi Li , Haifeng Xu

In this work, we investigate the online learning problem of revenue maximization in ad auctions, where the seller needs to learn the click-through rates (CTRs) of each ad candidate and charge the price of the winner through a pay-per-click…

Information Retrieval · Computer Science 2024-03-05 Zhe Feng , Christopher Liaw , Zixin Zhou

Incentive compatibility (IC) is one of the most fundamental properties of an auction mechanism, including those used for online advertising. Recent methods by Feng et al. and Lahaie et al. show that counterfactual runs of the auction…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2019-07-19 Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi , Stefano Leonardi , Okke Schrijvers , Eric Sodomka
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